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MINIMUM GOVERNMENT
AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF
NIGERIA'S PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION

By Akinadę Olumuyiwa Sanda

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
**MINIMUM GOVERNMENT AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF
NIGERIA'S PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION**

By

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Professor of Public Administration

**An Inaugural Lecture Delivered at the University of Ife
(now Obafemi Awolowo University)
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Inaugural Lecture Series 82



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I feel highly honoured to be a part of this great and universal tradition of the academic community. It is indeed gratifying that, in spite of my location within the context of the academic disciplines of Sociology and Public Administration, I have this opportunity to deliver the 4th in the series of inaugural lectures from the Faculty of Administration, University of Ife. The first inaugural lecture from the Faculty of Administration was by Professor Y.A.D.S. Samaratunga and it was delivered on the subject "Accountancy, Society and Economic Development"; the second inaugural lecture was given by Professor O. Aluko on the theme "Necessity and Freedom In Nigerian Foreign Policy"; and the third inaugural lecture was given by Professor 'Ladipo Adamolekun on "Administrative Power".

My concern in this lecture is primarily with the elucidation of some of the critical considerations that must inform any serious or genuine strategy for managing the Nigerian economy, especially its public sector, efficiently and effectively. Management is central to public administration. Indeed, as already underscored by other authors, public administration revolves around the various components of management, including the environments, the resources and the problems of managing an economy, a polity or different types of organizations in society.

Within the general framework of management, public administration may entail a focus upon questions of policy, budgeting, staffing records or reports, coordination or planning. It is the planning component which has always been a pre-occupation and a challenge for me, even though issues of policy have also claimed a significant proportion of my academic preoccupations.¹ *There can be no effective management without planning; at the same time however, there can be no functional or result-oriented planning without the provision and utilization of relevant and accurate information on the human factor in the society or on the economy or the organizations to be managed.* Within the broad framework of managing an economy however, plan-

ning for development involves planning for the management of change.² And the management of change in government often entails administrative reform. This is the rationale for my advocacy of minimum government as a necessary reform for Nigeria's administration.

This lecture is on the need for systematic planning for adequate units of organization in Nigeria's public sector; and it is only by way of reflecting one and only one of the several strategies for ensuring purposeful planning in government that the current theme – minimum government – has been chosen. Government, it must be remembered, cannot be misconceived to be an end by itself; indeed, government is, or at least, should be a means to an end; and as a consequence, the size, structure, character, quality, membership, stability, or change in government, must be of direct significance to all those who are concerned with fostering change and development in society. Indeed, any government, in any society, whether developed, developing, or underdeveloped cannot escape from the ever-present need to accord planning a pride of place among other usual pre-occupations of government.

Planning, government and development are three closely related, yet separate, but interdependent processes that all societies, and most especially, developing societies like Nigeria, have to keep under review on a continuous basis if, on the one hand, the purposes of government will be largely accomplished, and on the other, the aspirations of the governed or the wishes of members of society will ever be realised.

Some scholars believe that planning as a State activity originated from Russia. This was why planning was initially abhorred by many people as an instrument of authoritarian regimes until relatively recently. Economic planning as a government response to specific development problems however originated from the West, where the problems of post-world war II reconstruction and the demands for modernization provided the greatest stimulus to European nations like France; in the latter state, the first effort at the

application of a Plan was in the 1930s depression. In Italy, the impetus to planning was provided by pervasive structural unemployment and regional imbalances in development. In Britain, the slow pace of economic growth provided the stimulus for planning. In India, planning emerged out of the public concern for severe shortages in social services like housing, drinking water and general congestion of the population in towns and cities. And in Ireland, it was the economic stagnation of the 1950s which induced the demand for a more rational strategy of socio-economic management.

In general therefore, the specific needs of different societies have given rise to the adoption of planning as a means of systematically satisfying such needs or realising the stated objectives of government. In this sense, planning has been and may be undertaken in order to provide solutions to an existing social economic or political problem. The elimination of hunger, the activation of youthful energies,³ the enhancement of productivity in the public or private sector, or the improvement of a society's quality of life through even development, accelerated growth, or social equalization may all constitute the targets of any conscious planning efforts.

In Nigeria, planning as a direct effort of government began with the colonial regime's "*Ten-year Plan of Development and Welfare*" which was launched in 1946. Nigeria has therefore witnessed at least four decades of State initiated planning efforts. And independent Nigeria has prepared and attempted to implement four national development plans – 1962-68; 1970-74; 1975-80 and 1981-85.

It is instructive to underscore the direct linkages between public administration, planning and any society's social and economic development. It is the public administration of a nation, as manifested by the existing structures or machineries of government which largely determine the success or failure of policy formulation and plan implementation. In other words, since public administration is a direct instrument of the State's social, political and economic actions, the process, problems and consequences of planning

in Nigerian public administration should be of the utmost concern to both scholars and rulers alike. Much more specifically, public administration in a developing society such as Nigeria needs to be transformed into a dynamic instrument of development. In the attempts to ensure this orientation, public administration, especially the machineries of government, needs to be consciously planned, and guided reforms of all public agencies — the civil service, the parastatals, the universities, the research institutes — should be engineered. This is the context for the selection of the topic of this lecture. *And it is being emphasised that genuine planning for public administration requires an intimate knowledge of people, their culture and forms of social organization.*

The topic of my lecture brings into focus two fundamental underpinnings of my academic preoccupations over the last one and a half decades. On the one hand is my intimate concern with planning as well as with all the critical requirements for making planning effective in organizations and in society. On the other, the ways in which society impinges upon the planning process or the absence of systematic planning has also been a major area of my academic pre-occupation. Both concerns have however always been bound together by an overriding concern with pragmatism and a desire to contribute to the solution of problems, either in public organizations or in their larger environments.⁴

I wish to suggest that, *at no other time before now in the life of this nation, has its public administration been a victim of inadequately planned expansion in the structures and functions of government.* The negative consequences of uncontrolled growth have now commanded the attention of both the scholars and the practitioners in the field of public administration especially in the attempt to arrest those negative consequences of previously uncontrolled or inadequately planned institutional growth.

It is important at this juncture to underscore the relevance of sociology for practically every pre-occupation of man. The sociologist is at home with princes, presidents, politicians

and private power brokers. This is partly the reason why all over the world, there is usually the division of sociology into sub-areas like the sociology of medicine, the sociology of work, the sociology of marriage, the sociology of development, political sociology, and sociology of the future and, of course, *the sociology of complex organizations.* Public administration embraces the specialised area of the sociology of complex organizations.

Although, the sociologist is often concerned with the human dimensions of the organization under investigation, he brings to bear on such an organization a sociological imagination which enables him to perceive both the dynamics and the persistence of cultural and structural patterns as well as their implications for organised social life. The sociologist by and large is an organizational man. When he is not working for a ministry or a department of State, he is studying the problems identified by a Foundation or a business organization. His efforts may be oriented toward sensitising administrators in a variety of bureaucratic organizations to the recognition of specific contradictions and problems inhibiting performance and effectiveness in such organizations. A fundamental posture of the sociologist in this respect has been cogently put by Eldridge and Crombie: "Whatever stance the Sociologist does adopt as a change agent, it is probably fair to say that *usually it is within the conception of planned social change. Indeed, the sociologist's involvement is seen in its relation to the planning function* — whether he be advising or evaluating the plan..."⁵ (my emphasis).

One of the most critical functional requirements of an effective administrative structure is planning. And here, the sociologist is a willing agent and a repository of planning strategies. And it is within the framework of the most urgent requirement of contemporary Nigerian society that the planning function of Nigeria's public administration must be perceived.

I had observed earlier on the intimate linkages between planning for change and development, and the effective

management of Nigeria's economy. It is the inadequate appreciation of these linkages that often induces some analysts to apportion the blames for the persistence of Nigeria's underdevelopment largely in the wrong quarters. Six years ago I delivered a keynote address on the topic "How Africans Underdevelop Africa" at an International Conference on the Social Consequences of Unequal Development in Africa.⁶ It was meant to be partly a complement and partly a critique of Walter Rodney's landmark contribution on *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*.⁷ But more importantly, that keynote address was directed at re-appraising the wisdom in making scape goats of "external enemies" or alien exploiters as the culprits or creators of Nigeria's current economic, political and social misfortunes. If a quarter of a century after independence, we in Nigeria have merely recognised the fact that some of the developed countries rose on our backs to prosperity and we are yet to organise ourselves adequately for purposes of development, then we are likely to remain underdeveloped for a very long time. **By now, Nigerians must have become sufficiently** exposed to numerous empirical evidences which point at the internal roots of our society's continued underdevelopment to ponder on the wisdom of laying blame at the door of external exploiters.

The time has come for us as a people to recognise the fact that the developed countries will for ever continue to exploit our poor and inadequate organizational forms to their own advantage; and that *neither an exploiting alien nation nor a friendly aid-granting world power, can help us to manage our economy and implement our development plans. Nigerians and only Nigerians will have to organise and re-organise our dis-organised and un-organised or inadequately organised sectors, especially the public service.*

In essence, what is being suggested in this lecture is that our organised agencies for the implementation of government policies, the civil service, the state-owned enterprises, the research institutes, universities, government-owned hospitals, etc., are currently experiencing management and organiza-

tional problems which largely derive from unplanned or inadequately planned growth and expansion which need to be understood and resolved if the level of performance in those government agencies are ever to be enhanced sufficiently to provide an engine to development.

When government entered into management agreements with alien organizations and consultants, it was partly to overcome the management and organizational obstacles to performance in different arms of the public sector. This was the situation in 1978 that led the then Federal Military Government to enter into a management agreement with Rail India Technical and Economic Service (RITES). Similarly, between 1979-81, the Nigerian Airways - K.L.M. management agreement was in operation. The Federal Palace Hotel, the Ogun State Hotels, the Hotel Presidential, Enugu, and the Oyo State Paper Mill, were also some of the other government organizations which had to enter into management agreements with alien firms. Obviously, management constitutes one of the crucial needs of the public sector organizations in Nigeria today. This is not to underplay other considerations which often influence the **content of such agreements. For instance, corruption and misappropriation of funds are inevitable in public organizations where there is poor management or where such problems as over large size and structure or cumbersome procedures create loopholes for unscrupulous officials.** As noted by Donald Stone, and Alice Stone: "Management is the heart and distinguishing feature of public administration. Together with concern for policy and function, it is the synthesizing element which gives public administration the character of a social profession drawing on many disciplines and specialised knowledge."⁸ In order to appreciate the extent to which and the ways in which management problems militate against public sector performances in Nigeria, it is necessary to understand their linkages to other problems of organization.

Nigeria's public administration is undergoing a crisis. And

it is self destructive to continue to lay the blames for such a crisis on our external friends or adversaries. If we intend to escape from, or successfully resolve the crisis, *we must come to grips with the sociological roots of the current crisis, and we must plan deliberately in order to eliminate the problems identified.* This is the reason why it is important to appreciate the sociology of Nigeria's public administration.

There are three fundamental concepts in sociology: indeed two of them were considered by Alvin Gouldner as the basic programmatic concepts in the discipline.⁹ These concepts are those of (1) culture (2) society (3) social system.

The culture of a nation is the learned and shared way of life of its people, and it is transmitted from one generation to another. Such a way of life includes the customs, the beliefs, the tastes, the traditions, the values, the behaviour patterns, the language, the attitudes and the general perception of the world which people acquire as a consequence of their adjustment to group living in a society. Obviously, our conception of culture transcends the narrower conception of culture which is implied in references to dance, art, crafts, or festivals, all of which represent just a small component of the cultural domain in society. Our culture is our way of life. Of course, some elements of our culture may in fact be irrelevant for the further upliftment of society; other aspects of our culture may be absolutely necessary for our growth and development. The significant point is that we cannot afford to ignore the quality and consequences of different manifestations of our life for the current predicament of Nigerian public administration.

However, just as we may speak of the culture of a people we can also speak of the administrative or the bureaucratic culture or sub-culture in a society. In the latter situation what is implied is the total way of life characterising the bureaucracy and the bureaucrats. This is an area in which cultural autonomy and cultural dependence conflict. The sub-culture of the government functionaries is however not altogether independent of the culture of the rest of the wider

society. Indeed, it mirrors the society of which it is a part in certain significant respects. This is why *society's culture imbues the public organizations with either administrative capacity or bureaucratic incapacity through the effects of the bureaucrat's adoption of some aspects of the culture of the larger society.*

By the concept society I mean to refer to a group of people with its own culture or peculiar way of life, existing under a government and whose members are in continuous interaction, even though such interaction may involve class or ethnic or other forms of power relations. This is the form in which we can speak of the Nigerian society with its own culture, its own class and ethnic structures and its own power relations. An important attribute of a society as far as the sociologist is concerned is its coercive nature. Durkheim once observed the external and constraining influences of social facts on members of a society, through the patterns of culture, the patterns of behaving, thinking, believing (the values, norms, and expectations which determine social relations), society often compels its members to act in particular directions. This is not to ignore entirely the individual aspects of social action. But it is to underscore the social nature of many seeming aberrations in the behaviour of members of our complex organization. For example, there are innumerable ways in which much of the deviant behaviour of some public servants can be linked with the demands and social pressures from the wider Nigerian society (e.g. spraying of the Naira at parties, corruption or embezzlement of public funds).

The third concept, the concept of social system implies the existence of a whole which consists of some interdependent, inter-connected and inter-related parts, which are in constant and continuous interactions. For example, in Nigerian society, the efforts of the government to foster socio-economic development is directly dependent upon the availability of an efficient Civil Service; the latter is in turn dependent upon the quality of output from the educational

and training institutions; which in turn largely determine the quality and quantity of personnel which will be available for government mobilization. The quality or quantity of personnel has a direct influence upon the quality of performance of the organization. It is important to emphasise the significance of the phenomenon of interdependence for the process of administration. The interdependence of different policies, of proposed solutions to problems in the public sector, and the consequences of such interdependence, are nowhere more evident than in the public sector organizations.

Let me now illustrate the direct relevance of some elements of Nigerian culture for the bureaucratic culture in the public service and for the current level of performance in the public service. The Nigerian public servant may have received a few queries during the course of the year; he may have in fact earned a written warning or two in the course of the same interval. However, when the time for his annual review or consideration for the promotion of other workers is due, he may be the first to exert direct and indirect pressures on his Head of Department through nocturnal visits, to obtain a positive report on his record of performance. Where the Head of his Department refuses to yield to the worker's pressures, influential people from outside his organizations may be brought in to put more pressure upon such a Head of Department, a Permanent Secretary, or a Dean of a Faculty, or even a Vice-Chancellor of a university as the case may be. This is the lobbying culture at work. And it is one of the main impediments to efficient performance in the public sector.

A relevant anecdote concerning the Nigerian citizen may be used to further illustrate and emphasize the pervasive nature and the negative consequence of the lobbying culture in our public administration, let us for a moment imagine the nature of the scene on the biblical Day of Judgement. With the Lord seated on the high table and surrounded by His emissaries, the angels and archangels, and facing the sea of heads of former citizens from all parts of the world who have

come to receive their judgement in regard to their activities while they were on the earth. Just about the time when the Lord is about to start pronouncing his judgements, one can imagine the Nigerians in the crowd making enquiries about God and asking questions from fellow beings awaiting judgement in the following vein:

Does anyone know Him? (i.e. God)
Who is his wife? Does anyone know her?
Which angel is closest to him?
Who is His best friend?
Can we pass an envelope to Him?
Or can we see Him at home?

Even in heaven, the typical Nigerian, after committing all the atrocities imaginable under the sun would still imagine that he can win, or escape retributive justice merely through the lobbying of even God Himself. This is one of the critical and fundamental roots of our perpetual failure to make our public organizations work. *Nigerians in the public sector have almost destroyed the very basis of efficient performance through the widespread adoption of the lobbying sub-culture.*

Human resources — people at work — constitute the cornerstone of an efficient and effective administrative structure. Modern bureaucratic organization demands the application of rules, respect for competence and expertise, reward of efficient performance and punishment for incompetence, and correction or control of inefficiency according to agreed rules and procedure. To the contrary, the Nigerian administrative culture currently respects contacts, influence, ethnicity and above all the federal character. Here lies some of the cultural contradictions which engender administrative incapacity in Nigeria's public service organizations.

It is this administrative incapacity or the limited administrative capacity of the over-expanded government bureaucracy which now induces the call for minimum government. And it is only through deliberate planning that we can obtain functional minimum government. Such planning efforts will be directed at ensuring optimal allocation and utilization

of resources, and the anticipation and control of consequences or impacts of government measures in the public sector.

Minimum government entails four inter-related processes:

1. Minimum involvement or intervention of government in areas where government cannot be efficient or cost effective;
2. Massive focus of government efforts on limited attainable goals during the tenure of each government's administration;
3. Minimum citizen's dependence upon the government for services which should or could be provided by the people for themselves;
4. Maximum participation of citizens in affairs affecting their well-being.

The call for the adoption of minimum government derives largely from the apparent inability of the over-expanded machinery of government to cope with its current obligations. Government involvement in virtually every sphere of human, social and economic endeavours has exposed the State to considerable strains and stresses which can only be alleviated by the State's adoption of appropriate units or government agencies within appropriate spheres of government action or responsibilities.

The personnel, institutions, financial burden and responsibilities of government have grown out of proportion with the absorptive capacity of the State over the last quarter of a century. It is incumbent on public administration to respond to the changes both within it and in its environment. As noted by Cadwallader: "... an open system, whether social or biological, in a changing environment either changes or perishes... if a complex social organization is to survive critical changes in its environment, it can do so only by changing its structure or behaviour"¹⁰ In the current predicament of Nigeria's public sector organizations, consciously planned changes are required in both the structure and behaviour of both the organizations and their members.

UNRESTRAINED GROWTH: GOVERNMENT AS BIG BUSINESS

The rapid expansion of the State Sector is not a phenomenon which is exclusively Nigerian. As observed by Colin Baker in relation to the rapid growth of Civil Service in Africa: "... The general pattern is one of somewhat disturbing expansion..."¹¹ In Nigeria, the growth of the bureaucracy has been phenomenal. Many explanations have been proffered for this observed trend. One view-point sees the root in the State's acceptance of the crucial roles of generating and implementing development through the public sector. This assumed function induces the State to engage in activities which are meant to accumulate capital and ensure the redistribution of resources. It is this orientation which presumably leads to the creation of new institutions for accumulation and redistribution. What is most often ignored is the fact that the creation of such new institutions cannot guarantee enhanced level of performance if the new institutions are managed by the same or similar personnel, who manifest the same values and behaviour patterns as those in the antecedent organizations¹² which were already found unsuitable.

A second viewpoint explains the growth in the State machinery of government by looking at the State ideology. For adherents of the socialist ideology, it is the State that should control all organs of development, planning and implementation. State control of the economy is, however, not the same thing as socialism. The latter involves the collective ownership or control of the means of production and distribution. However, State capitalism may in reality not involve more than token representation of the collectivity and may in fact be a ruse for the promotion of the interest of a social class or a ruling oligarchy.

It must be noted that the control which is often exercised by the State on the means of production and distribution even in socialist systems is very relative and never total.

Even in older socialist systems like the Chinese State, a significant portion of the government's economy is in the private sector. John Dixon recently observed what he perceived as the "legitimation of private enterprise" in China even in the 1980s.¹³

For the capitalist, the public sector is a residual category which should be pre-occupied only with those areas in which the private sector is not active. Capitalism entrusts the responsibility for growth and development mainly to private entrepreneurs. With the size and structure of her public sector, the Nigerian government cannot be said to reflect true capitalism.

The mixed economy alternative is often conceived as transitional in the State's movement either to socialism or toward welfarism; hence the claim of exponents of the mixed economy of their need to control the "commanding heights" of the economy. The mixed economy is the natural home of State capitalism whether it is of the Japanese, the Indian, or the Nigerian model. In the Japanese model, public funds get transferred to the private sector and the State engages in the so-called pioneering roles for the private sector; in the Indian model, the State makes its presence felt in virtually all spheres of industry. In the Nigerian model of the mixed economy option, public funds get transferred to the private sector but simultaneously, the state also pretends to make its presence felt in all areas of socio-economic life.

As I have shown elsewhere, with regard to the Nigerian experience, the mixed economy approach to development is replete with contradictions.¹⁴ It enables the government to engage in precisely those economic ventures for which it is organizationally least prepared. Nevertheless, it provides a great justification for the establishment of new organizations as agents of government, with the consequent growth of the public service, and the multiplication of public organizations whose administrative capacities are severely limited.

With particular reference to Nigeria, the first generation of political leaders inherited a law and order government at

independence. However, the politicians had promised a life more abundant for the citizens and hence they were inclined not only to forge national integration but also to promote social and economic development. The initial shortage of private investors and entrepreneurs at independence, the nationalists' rejection of alien economic domination and the deliberate desire of government to foster accelerated development, all led to the swift assumption of wide duties and the promotion of enterprises in virtually all spheres of human endeavour. Such a trend was to be expected in a Service State. It was just the inadequate planning which preceded the growth and expansion which produced strains and stresses for government bureaucracy.

Additionally however, government efforts at reducing the initial domination of the Nigerian economy by alien investors particularly through indigenization in the 1970s; and the increasing demands on government for services which were previously unavailable (or where available, provided by private entrepreneurs); all led to continuous institutional growth and increase in the size of the Nigerian public sector. Of course, the environment of the Nigerian public service was never static.¹⁵ Indeed, the population of the country increased from its 1963 Census figure of fifty-six million to the 1980 estimate of eighty-five million and 1985 extrapolation to about one hundred million.

Similarly, the educational and training institutions continued to increase both their intakes and their outputs, the latter constituting the actual or potential members of the public sector organizations. Traditionally, management of the public schools benefitted from the functional differentiation of institutions into (a) government schools (b) government assisted schools (c) voluntary agency schools and (d) private schools. However, as from the early seventies all schools became government schools for purposes of administration. The separation between ownership and control became blurred. Additionally, the introduction of the Universal Primary Education throughout Nigeria and the declaration of free education at all levels by the civilian

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regimes in five of the nineteen states from 1979–1980 also resulted in astronomical increase in the number and size of the school system. With the changes came severe administrative problems including increase in ghost teachers, resource inadequacy, including classrooms, equipment, teachers, and other personnel and subsequent ineffective management and decline in the quality of education.

The universities suffered a similar fate with the rapid increase in the number from two at independence to twenty-four (sixteen federal and eight state) universities in 1985. A more crisis-prone aspect of higher educational administration which has emerged with increased government spending on the institutions concerns the issue of autonomy of the universities in the context of increasing governmental control through the Ministry of Education, the National Universities Commission (N.U.C.) and the periodic visitation panels. Growth in terms of size and number of universities have therefore brought into prominence severe organizational problems within the university system in Nigeria.

Similarly, with respect to the research institutes, the growth of structures has been phenomenal.¹⁶ As of 1984 when we completed a survey in this regard, there were a total of twenty-four research institutes which were under the Federal Ministry of Science and Technology alone, apart from others which were under the Federal Ministry of National Planning, the Ministry of Education and various universities. Eighteen of the research institutes have been concerned with one aspect of agriculture or another. As at now there are at least thirty six research institutes focussing upon different aspects of Nigeria's development. Certainly, Nigeria can do with a lesser number of government-sponsored research institutes where universities are adequately funded to pursue relevant research projects.

In essence, therefore, the development orientation of the government leaders and their confusion of development with growth induced the promotion of growth in the public sector. At the same time, the ideological and environmental

contexts of Nigeria's public service provided another set of stimuli to growth. With particular regard to the environment, the citizens over the years have become socialized into perceiving the government as father-christmas from whom endless demands and requests should be made, irrespective of the ability of the government to cope, or the capacity of the people to accommodate such requests on their own, independently of government intrusion. This undesirable tendency explains government's assumption of such ridiculous duties as the disposal of refuse or the selling of "essential commodities" in an environment in which virtually every commodity has become essential. It is instructive to recognize the fact that government did not initially assume responsibility for such duties; only individuals, associations and families did; and such individuals' actions or inactions were duely *regulated* by the government. The utilization of the machinery of government for such duties however simultaneously reduced the available options for private initiatives and community assumption of social responsibilities.

The phenomenal nature of the consequent growth of the public sector can be illustrated with some relevant indices. The total plan figures at the inception of the first National Development Plan 1962–68 showed that the public sector's share of the five-year plan was 56%. By the time of the Second Development Plan 1970–75, the State sector had grown to account for 62% of the total plan expenditure. As at the third plan period – 1975-80, the share of the public sector was already 81%. By the fourth Plan period, this figure of the share of the public sector had grown to become 86% of the total plan expenditure. In effect, the private sector is currently the residual category accounting for barely fourteen per cent of the total plan.

In terms of manpower expansion, the public sector could boast of about 200,000 workers in 1960; by 1983, this figure of the public sector manpower had grown to become 3.7 million, representing about 65% of the total number of

employees in the modern sector. The magnitude of the size of the public sector manpower is brought closer home by the following testimony from the Fourth National Development Plan (1981-85) document. The public sector, which was defined as embracing the federal and state civil services, the government corporations and companies (i.e. the parastatals) and the teaching services, account for three-fifths of the total estimated employment in the modern sector of Nigerian economy. Within each state, however, the estimate is even more; the public sector accounts for approximately three quarters of the estimated modern sector employment in each of the majority of the nineteen states. This implies that the private sector accounts for two-fifths of the total modern sector employment in Nigeria, and in most of the individual states, the private sector represents only about one-quarter of the modern sector employment.

In terms of the growth and expansion of governmental organizational structures, the states grew from three regions in 1960 to nineteen states in 1976, with all the attendant growth of public sector in each of the nineteen states. As for the parastatals or state-owned enterprises, the growth was phenomenal. In fact, it is probably safe to suggest that no one really knows the exact number of parastatals in Nigeria today. As at 1981, Onosode¹⁷ provided a list of about 200 State-owned enterprises for the federal government alone, while Udoji¹⁸ as far back as 1974 puts the estimate at about 250. At Independence in 1960, there were about fifty State-owned enterprises. By 1983, there were already about three hundred State-owned enterprises including 136 major ones for the federal government alone. And for the whole of the country, there are currently about three thousand State-owned enterprises or parastatals of various forms and sizes. Ukwu, I. Ukwu has for example recently observed that:

Public enterprises occupy a much more important position in Nigeria's economy than is generally realised. ...Latest available figures indicate that public enterprises account for some 17% of modern sector and 28% of public sector employment. In the Federal Budget of 1982, provisions for 23

named public enterprises accounted for 25% of the total appropriation for recurrent expenditure and 90% of all recurrent grants and subventions. On capital projects, the 29 major public enterprises mentioned in the Fourth National Development Plan are charged with the direct responsibility for executing half the entire Federal Program.¹⁹

In essence, what is being emphasised is the phenomenal growth and expansion in government as represented by its public sector bureaucracies within a period of less than three decades.

It is probably easier to grasp the unsettling effects of such rapid and largely unplanned growth on state structures and on the performance of government institutions, if we briefly illustrate with the experience of one or two states. In Lagos state for example, by the time the military was handling over power in October, 1979, there were eleven ministries, two departments, four extra-ministerial departments and less than twenty parastatals. By 1983, government restructuring had resulted in a significant growth, with the number of ministries increased to thirteen, departments and extra-ministerial departments increased to fifteen, and more than fifty parastatals which about tripled the initial number, four years earlier. Indeed, these developments led to a phenomenal increase of the State Government Budget from ₦475.8 million in 1979/80 to ₦1,010.8 million in 1983. A similar pattern could be depicted for Oyo state²⁰ and for many other states in Nigeria.

The preceding pattern was probably responsible for the observation by Udoji more than a decade ago in his Main Report: "Running public services is now big business requiring big business management. Today, the public services of Nigeria are involved in affairs beyond the imagining of our civil servants 15 years ago."²¹ That assessment is more valid today than it was more than a decade ago. But are we doing all these things efficiently and effectively?

The extra-rapid expansion and consequently large size of government bureaucracy has resulted in several consequences, many of which have not been positive. *Such uncontrolled*

and inadequately planned growth has resulted in intra-organizational difficulties in finances, in recruitment, and especially, in the stunted performance of both the employees and the bureaucratic organisations.

It is important to underscore the usually dire consequences of unplanned growth for organisational finances. This is however not the emphasis in this lecture. The sociological reality of organizational crisis, or of bureaucratic anomie, which derive from unrestrained growth, unplanned increases in government size, unanticipated expansion of governmental functions, and the increasing adoption of second-best option in personnel recruitment, constitute our main concern.

The first symptom of the resultant crisis became evident in 1975 when about 12,000 public servants were removed from their places of employment as a direct consequence of the nation-wide purge of the services. About one decade later, another 11,091 workers were initially removed from the service as a result of the 1984/85 retrenchment exercises in the public service. By the end of 1985, it was estimated that a total of about 15,000 workers lost their employment in the federal public service while the figure for the entire federation was estimated to be about 100,000. If planning had been adequate, the massive retrenchment would not have been necessary.

Obviously therefore, *the government bureaucracy started to fall apart as a result of rapid and unplanned or inadequately planned expansion of structures and personnel.* The critical nature of the situation is evident in the continued inadequacy of government financial resources for coping with the expanded responsibilities of government. *This situation calls for a drastic response; indeed, it demands a drastic cut in the current size of government and the institutionalization of planned enhancement of both the size and capacity of government in the future.*

There is the second major evidence of the current crisis in the machinery of government, especially in relation to the State-owned enterprises. This is the crisis of limited perfor-

mance, limited productivity, limited efficiency, and limited effectiveness. No matter how the initial objectives are couched, the results are almost always negative. Whether the stated objectives relate to cost minimization, or maximum profitability or even maximum social gains, including service or employment generation, the results are very often the same limited and often indefensible level of performance.²²

Judging from the overwhelming constraints on the efficient management of State-owned enterprises, it is my contention that it is most unrealistic and palpably futile to expect that at some time in the future, the State-owned enterprises will overcome all its current or historical obstacles and start to perform. It is not just that government is mostly inefficient in business matters; beyond that, it is my view that government just cannot be efficient, judging by the existing level of administrative capacity as well as the culture of public service. It is certainly self-destructive for this nation to think that government can ever be efficient through most of the parastatal organizations. But what is responsible for the situation? Is the situation due to the inadequacy of financial resources as is often claimed?

In the first decades which followed the attainment of Nigeria's independence, the federal government revenue increased in astronomical proportions. For example, in 1960/61, total federal revenue was ₦224 million; in 1965/66, it was ₦320 million. By 1970/71 it had increased to ₦676 million and by 1975/76 it again increased to ₦5.9 billion, and further to ₦12.3 billion in 1979/80. In a period of twenty years which followed independence, and in spite of the three years of the Civil War, the nation experienced a favourable and steady supply of financial resources which only required the management ability of those entrusted with the management of the nation's economy to be channelled into the society's development needs.

With the exception of the last five years, the nation had not been in want of necessary financial resources for its development needs. Even when specific State-owned enter-

prises were examined, we observed that each of them had in the preceding decade or so enjoyed satisfactory financial support from government.²³ It would seem therefore that different dimensions of the government policies which impinge upon personnel in State-owned enterprises provide a much more plausible explanation of the current situation.

First, there is the instability of the organizational leadership and of the environment of public sector institutions; secondly, there is the perennial problem of personnel – both in quality and quantity; there is the third problem of the primacy of politics; fourth is the constraint imposed by the ethnic factor or the perpetual tendency to apply the federal character clause in the Constitution at the expense of consideration of merit or competence; and lastly, there is the problem of inadequate administrative capacity. Each of these obstacles to effective performance by State-owned enterprises will now be examined briefly but separately.

Culture of Instability

In 1962 when the first National Development Plan was launched, the occasion coincided with the defunct Western Region's crisis of leadership. The uncertainty which characterised the day-to-day bureaucratic and political behaviour of the time adversely affected the effective implementation of the 1962-68 plan. Indeed, by 1966, the series of crises, including census and elections crises culminated in the military coup d'état of that year and the subsequent 1967–1970 civil war. Certainly, these did not constitute the type of conducive environment of administration which could make for success in the planning and management of the Nigerian economy.

The second National Development Plan 1970-74 had to cope with the problems of reconciliation, reconstruction and rehabilitation. The post-war stable political environment was however short-lived and by the time the 3rd National Development Plan 1975-80 was on the verge of being launched on an implementation trail, the 1976 coup d'état

had occurred.

The 1980-85 plan was similarly interrupted by the 1983 coup d'état. Indeed, in spite of the phenomenal increases in the planned investments from one plan period to another – from ₦2.2 billion in 1962 to ₦3.2 billion in 1970, ₦30 billion in 1975, later revised upwards to ₦43.3 billion before the 1980-85 plan – the unstable political environment constituted a major constraint on the systematic management of the public sector. The consequence of such instability for administrative capacity is reflected in series of disparate and unco-ordinated administrative measures by various military and civilian regimes alike. A good example of the consequences of such pattern of instability may be cited as illustration.

When a new regime comes into power, all the governing councils of universities and polytechnics, Boards of statutory corporations and other parastatals get dissolved irrespective of the tenure of office or record of performance of the serving directors, members of governing councils as the case may be. Even in the civil service, some permanent secretaries get retired and new ones are appointed. New promotions and appointments may definitely take some time to materialise. *The time lag between periods of councils or Board dissolution and reconstitution and the re-establishment of normal administration and relative emotional stability of the serving officers provide constant occasions of relative inactivity and low level of performance.* When such periods of lag occur with almost inevitable regularity, the level of uncertainty in the machinery of government can be (and certainly has been) most debilitating. The culture of instability already imposed by both the politicians and the soldiers require to be replaced by a relatively more positive culture of stability.

The allusion to the emerging culture of instability brings into focus a major area of Nigeria's public administration – the problem of succession to offices or posts in core performance areas like headships of organizations, departments, and even most importantly to governorship of states and

headship of the nation. All these core performance centres which experience perennial problems of succession reduce the ability of the machinery of government to cope effectively with the demands of society. This is the reason why it is most essential for the current regime to evolve a set of clear, unambiguous and operational guidelines for succession into political and administrative positions in government.

Quality of Personnel

The reference to competent personnel in government requires some elaboration. It was Nevil Johnson who observed that: "...how bureaucracies operate does depend extensively on how they are staffed and on the attitudes of those in them."²⁴ Perhaps in no other society is this statement most instructive than it is in Nigeria. Some of my research have shown the limitations imposed on individual and organizational performance by inadequacies in the human elements in the organizations. Of all the resources that may be considered essential for the effective operation of government's administration, *human resources, especially the quality and quantity of personnel, appear to be the most critical in the determination of quality of performance and level of productivity in government.* Information, financial and physical resources can only be properly harnessed in furtherance of the goals of government administration by a properly oriented and competent personnel with requisite skills or knowledge. The Adebo report (1971) as well as Udoji report (1974) both indicated the critical need for according greater attention to worker's quality, as well as to performance or result orientation, than to seniority or certificates. In 1974, the Udoji report observed the ways in which government job was perceived by many workers as opportunities to spend working time on jobs which were in no way connected with the public service. And almost a decade later, in 1982, Al St. Charles provided an apt description of the same situation:

In a typical manufacturing company owned by Nigerians and run by Asians, most of the Nigerian employees beg to do overtime hours. But in a typical Nigerian Ministry... the employee starts eyeing the clock for departure time by 12 noon... Thousands of executive officers occupying public service seats do not stay on seat hourly or daily – and not on seat could range from the fact that the officer is inside but having his breakfast with a friend (of either sex), or that he has gone by 10.00 a.m. on Wednesday to do his weekend shopping... Your mother could die in a telegram three times in a year and thrice you could officially go for her burial. But if the private sector pays more, it also fires more. You have to work hard for every Naira you earn... You have to be on your seat and you have to watch how many times you go to the toilet in a day.²⁵

In spite of the disfunctional attitude toward work and low level of commitment in the Civil and Public service however, these latter agencies of government constitute the central organizations for the implementation of government plans.

And yet, the services are not just infested with a dysfunctional or negative work ethics and a sub-culture of non-performance, they are also over-established. A study of the situation in Ondo state for example observed that a total of 1,991 workers were employed in a department which ought to have employed only 117 people. Similarly, a Registry which should consist of two workers had twelve; and a plantation which should consist of ten workers recruited one hundred labourers.²⁶

What we are witnessing therefore is a combination of Public sector patronage of low quality under-utilized personnel, with the presence in unusually large numbers of personnel that are normally not needed. This situation is explicable only in the context of the potent sub-culture of informal contacts, political influences on recruitments, the invocation of the principle of ethnic affiliation and federal character, all of which combine to recruit unsuitable, incompetent or unqualified labour for different arms of the public sector. Certainly this is not a pattern that should be allowed to persist either in the productive arms of the public sector

(the State-owned enterprises) or even in the other spheres of the public service.

Ethnicity/Federal Character versus Merit and Competence

The reference to the adverse consequences of the wide application of the constitutional principle of federal character requires some elaboration in view of the serious implications which that principle has for the quality of personnel in the public sector. For one thing, the public service is a microcosm of the wider Nigerian society, and each public organization is even more so in terms of ethnic heterogeneity..

More than two hundred and fifty ethnic groups co-exist in Nigeria even though only three of them account for close to 60% of the total population. Nigeria is therefore an ethnically heterogeneous society.²⁷ However, each ethnic group is also a segmentary society with potentials for further fragmentation into ethnic segments. For example, the Yoruba ethnic group becomes segmented into the Oyo, Ondo and Ogun in one context or into Ibadan, Ijebu, Ekiti etc. in another context. Similarly, the Ibo ethnic group becomes segmented into the Onitsha Ibo, Owerri Ibo etc. The ethnic heterogeneity in Nigerian society and the segmentary nature of the ethnic micro-societies provide the background to the minority ethnic group's fear of domination in the first republic and the exploitation of ethnic affiliation by both majority and minority ethnic members.²⁸

The members of the Constitution Drafting Committee who inserted the federal character principle into the nation's constitution responded to the problem posed by the interplay of ethnic politics and leadership defaults in the first Nigerian Republic. It will be recalled that the first Republic suffered from inter-ethnic fears and rejection of domination, intra-ethnic fear of exclusion and reciprocal distrust, both of which partly accounted for the wars of secession, and also for the subsequent fragmentation into nineteen states. The principle of federal character was meant to build some

canons of fairness and representativeness into the sharing of government offices and other scarce national resources. However, the subsequent applications of that principle in the public service have negated the fundamental premise of a meritocracy which in essence is what a government bureaucracy oriented toward sponsoring change and promoting development is supposed to be.

A Permanent Secretary in one of the states' civil services recently observed as follows:

The Civil Service has been bedevilled by the ethnic factor since 1975/76. One group has been identified as deliberately dominant and selfish in its hold of the service since then. Thus, the ethnic factor which was bred by the predominance of a group in political office holding stands as the exclusive basis for recruitment into service, posting into sensitive positions, and sometimes promotion and discipline, and many of the basic concession and privileges of the service. As a corollary, the ability to escape from justice, riggle into promotion, meander out of transfers, and assume a psychological position of influence was determined by one's own closeness (or distance) from the town or sub-tribe of the ruling group.²⁹

The contradictions between the ruling oligarchy's desire for a representative bureaucracy and the demand of the government bureaucracies for merit and competence largely account for the recruitment or appointment of personnel that are incapable of turning the government machinery into an instrument for development. For this nation to *overcome its present crisis of non-performance in government bureaucracies, there has to be a major departure from the past with regard to personnel recruitment and deployment in government bureaucracies.* The attempt to ensure justice and fairplay among ethnic groups must be tempered with considerations of merit and ability to perform. Alvin Toffler once observed that to survive, "Organizations must cast off those bureaucratic practices that immobilise them making them less sensitive and less rapidly responsive."³⁰ Indeed, recruitment, deployment and promotion


policies which inhibit personnel performance in Nigeria's public sector are overdue for review and reform.

There is a final component of the bureaucratic machinery of government which has negative consequences for performance in the public sector – the proverbial non-responsiveness of bureaucrats and bureaucracy to change. Ludvig von Mises would go as far as to assert that bureaucracy is by definition incapable of promoting change and that bureaucrats cannot be innovators.³¹ In a context in which the state or government is the nerve centre of aggressive intervention,³² the agents and agencies for intervention must be amenable to change otherwise government organizations, including State-owned enterprises may become disaster areas for non-performance.

Justification for Minimum Government

It is not necessary to catalogue the phenomenal expansion of the other spheres of the public sector and the consequent sociological repercussions before the main phenomenon of unplanned and uncontrolled expansion of government can be emphasised. It is important however to appreciate the scope and magnitude of both the manifest and latent consequences of such explosion in the size and scale of government organizations, particularly when these are combined with both latent and manifest consequences of the pervasiveness of our peculiar bureaucratic culture and consequent diminution of administrative capacity in government. Fig. 1 depicts the situation which now calls for conscious planning in order to obtain the functional minimum size, composition, and responsibilities of public organizations which are conducive to controlled growth, efficient and effective performance and development in society.

I have emphasised the fact that certain aspects of the bureaucratic culture of Nigerians adversely affect the quality of personnel which is recruited or retained, and the performance of such personnel in public sector organiza-



Source: Developed from the theories by J. E. Haas and T. E. Drabeck in *Complex Organizations*, Macmillan N.Y. & London, 1973.

Fig. 1: Coping with Requirements of effective Government through Planning

tions. The same attributes of Nigerian workers are not allowed to dominate the attitude and performance of personnel in the private sector. But personnel or human resources inadequacy often results in organizational or administrative incapacity. Such a limitation is undesirable in the public sector at a time when the State is expected to promote development through government involvement in numerous profit-oriented and service ventures. My emphasis upon system interdependence is also meant to bring into focus the consequences of each phenomenon already considered for other spheres of government and society.

Nevertheless, one fundamental point must be emphasized in this final section. I am not saying that all growth is undesirable; similarly, I have not said that all forms of expansion in the public service are to be abhorred. Rather, what I have been saying is that *any growth in the machinery of government must be properly and adequately planned if such growths are not to result in more negative than positive consequences for both the government and the citizens.*³³ Such conscious planning of change has not received adequate attention of both the government and scholars. Bureaucratic expansion is a kind of change which demands adequate knowledge of the social and cultural environment of proposed changes, and adequate information on the expected consequences of proposed changes. As noted by Samaratunga: "One cannot conceivably be deemed to plan something without an expectation of performance, nor can one be expected to perform something which has not been originally intended or planned."³⁴

Three main types of changes which relate to phenomenal increases in the size of government machinery and the scope of government actions have been examined³⁵ and shown to be in dire need of a renewed effort at deliberate planning. One is *change within the government organizations*, e.g. changes in recruitment policy, or in personnel commit-

ment and numbers; the other is *change of government organization* — through the addition of new organizational structures like the parastatals. And a third is the *change in demands on government by citizens* who are being governed (e.g. Specific requests for government intervention by citizens). It is the relative absence of regular as well as systematic reviews and coordinated planning of these three inter-related sources of change in government that largely accounted for the increased stress situation in many government organizations and the consequent decline of the performance structure in such organizations.

One solution is to *limit the size and scope of government intervention while a simultaneous effort is directed at planning for the establishment of a functional minimum size for all government organizations.* This implies that government may withdraw its involvement in some organizations and activities. Another is that for organizations from which government must withdraw its involvement, there will be need to establish clear guidelines on the basis or criteria of such disengagement and the beneficiaries of such actions. We have made relevant proposals in this regard in a different contribution (see Tables 1a — 5 attached as appendices).³⁶

In one of my recent contributions on this issue, I suggested five different criteria by which government may be guided in its efforts at limiting the size and scope of intervention in State-owned enterprises through privatization. First is the criteria of the current *level of government equity participation*, whether it is high, (50% and above), medium, (25% — 49%) or low (below 25%). Second, is the *specific domain* of the State-owned enterprises, whether it is in a *strategic or non-strategic* area. Third is the current *record of performance*, including details of such records over a period of five or more years. Fourth is the criterion of the extent of *government capacity* or competence in the management of specific enterprises. Fifth criterion is the *ready availability of Nigerian individuals or associations*

to assume the new responsibilities by either purchasing shares or owning and managing the total ventures.

For enterprises in which the level of government investment is low, (i.e. below 25%) and yet the performance is poor, and where the enterprises do not belong to any strategic endeavour, such enterprises should be sold to willing Nigerian associations. For other enterprises which are not in strategic domains, and in which government investment is substantial, (medium or high), all the stated criteria should be carefully applied in order to decide which enterprises to retain and which ones to privatize. This underscores the need for the collection of necessary preliminary information on, and valuation of all the State-owned enterprises for purposes of determining those from which government is to disengage. And for those organizations which are to remain in the government fold, government may have to undertake urgent and drastic reforms in such organizations, particularly with regard to the criteria for personnel recruitment, the basis of promotion or career advancement, and removal of manifest or latent consequences of the application of the constitutional principle of federal character.

My contention here therefore is that Nigerian public administration as a whole needs to be transformed into an instrument of development and in order to achieve such a goal, the main organs of public administration need to be consciously planned and guided reforms engineered in all arms of the machinery of government. Such reforms must be comprehensive if it is going to be effective. It has to embrace all public service organizations including the civil service, the research institutes, the parastatals, the universities, hospitals etc. In line with Allan R. Brewer-Carias' advice, "Administrative reform was not meant simply to achieve greater efficiency of the traditional public administration, *but to discard archaic structures that were incapable of keeping abreast with the country's transformations* and the changing mentality of the

people."³⁷ (emphasis added)

The implication is that planning for efficient and effective organizations in the public sector is one of the major requirements for coping with the current challenges of Nigeria's development. And it is in this connection that I have suggested that in the nation's interest and particularly in the public interest, all governments of the federation should disengage from non-strategic state-owned enterprises which cannot stand the test of efficient and effective performance.

It is not possible to continue the application of policies which inhibit the maximization of the potentials of the human resources in government organizations and still expect that all will be well with the level of productivity of the relevant organizations. The nature of system interdependence makes it inevitable for government organizations to fail to perform, or to fail in its obligations to the citizens, once the capacity of the human resources — the fundamental pivot of any effective organization — is largely inhibited, through either the state's policies and actions, or through the people's adoption of dysfunctional bureaucratic culture and traditions.

The planning of growth in government or in the public sector cannot be successfully undertaken without an accurate understanding of the extent of interdependence between the quality of personnel (human resources) the prevalent bureaucratic or administrative culture and the societal environment. The ever-present system interdependence makes adequate fostering of development in society dependent upon a consciously planned bureaucracy with a high level of administrative capacity and ability to implement society's development objectives through optimal allocation and utilization of resources.

More specifically, the current size of government has become too large for optimal allocation and utilization of resources and for efficient management. It is therefore urgent for government to plan for a minimum size commen-

surate with our existing human and material resources. The scope of government responsibilities has also grown beyond the administrative capacity of government, hence the need for delegation and decentralization of some of the current responsibilities of government.

Minimum government also assumes that each government will focus upon one or two objectives which it plans to achieve during its tenure — be it the supply of electricity to all nooks and corners of the society, halt to nerve-breaking inflation, eradication of illiteracy, or the elimination of armed robbery. Each regime should select a minimum number of goals the attainment of which will not only constitute objective measures of governmental performance, but will also enable succeeding regimes to focus upon other goals of development. In addition, a conscious effort must be made to re-educate the public in order to make them less dependent upon the government.

Finally, maximum participation of citizens in government may be effected through the full utilization of the traditional basis of social organization in all our local government areas. Earlier in this lecture, I have argued that management is central to government, public administration, and the effective control and direction of the economy. I have also argued that no effective management can be attained without adequate planning, including the planning of personnel and organizations which constitute the central machineries for the implementation of government policies in the public sector.

The current crisis of governance and public administration dictate that a great attention should be paid to the planning of the functionally minimum sizes for our public organizations most of which have been victims of unplanned growth and expansion in the last twenty five years.

A summary of recommendations made in the course of the lecture for adoption by government in Nigeria are as follows:

1. There should be *minimum government intervention*

in ventures in which government either cannot provide quality service to the citizens, or maximise profits (with a view to utilising such profits to provide further services like the generation of employment, provision of water, the supply of food etc.). This implies the necessity for urgent government disengagement from such ventures. This category of ventures must be systematically ascertained through a task force or study group.

2. Minimum government entails a *massive focus of the government upon limited attainable goals* during each government administration. This strategy should replace the usual spreading of limited resources over several conflicting goals and objectives which are carried from one government administration to another without any remarkable record of achievement.

3. Minimum government suggests *limited demand from or dependence upon the government* by the people for services which could be provided either through communal efforts of the people or through other modes of self reliance (voluntary associations, cooperative clubs etc.).

4. Minimum government demands *maximum involvement and participation of the people in the affairs affecting their well being* through local level and small units of organizations. This calls for decentralization, devolution and delegation of government responsibilities to other units in society.

In planning for minimum government, there is the need to obtain accurate and objective information on which to base government decision. And as a consequence,

1. Government enterprises should be appraised and a management audit provided on the actual implementation of the letters of the Act or Decree or objectives of setting up the State-owned enterprises. This exercise must be comprehensive, in order to provide all necessary information for adequate planning for minimum government.

2. All enterprises should be differentiated or categorised into at least two components: (1) strategic; and (2) non-strategic enterprises. While the first category can

be subjected to strategic planning and reforms, the latter category should further be differentiated into those performing and those not performing in accordance with management and government expectation; and those enterprises that are not performing out of the non-strategic enterprises should be privatized.

3. There are too many ministries at both the federal and state levels of government: consequently all ministries of Government should be reviewed now and at the inception of every plan period with a view to ascertaining which ministries have outlived their usefulness and which ones should be reformed, reduced in size or scope of responsibilities. This exercise is required at both the federal and state levels.
4. Research institutes should be re-organized with a view to pooling together scarce resources and encouraging group researches, and with a view to effecting such mergers as may be found conducive to the elimination of the problem of underutilization of highly skilled researchers.³⁸ From our previous researches, we have come to the conclusion that it is in the best interest of the society to have fewer but better funded research institutes than to retain the existing number, some of which have become mere employment agencies. The skilled manpower in those institutes which may be discontinued may be re-deployed to the newer universities.
5. There should be a halt to the establishment of new universities by governments, in order to avoid the promotion of growth without a commensurate assurance of quality in higher education. Private universities which comply with laid-down requirements or guidelines by the government may however be allowed to complement government efforts.
6. The place of culture in the problems of government administration should be addressed through research,

education and coordinated programme of public enlightenment.

It is not possible to achieve any of the listed suggestions without access to accurate information through research and information storage and records. It is therefore important for government and the private sector alike to sponsor research into different facets of planning for Nigerian public administration, especially, how to institutionalize the planning function at every level of the machinery of government. This is the only way to promote optimal resource allocation and utilization and administrative capacity in government.

Development planning is no longer enough in this society; there is also the need to plan for plan implementation. Planning for plan implementation however requires an adequate focus upon and reform of the agencies of implementation of government policies. This is the rationale for the call for minimum government in contemporary Nigerian Public Administration.

APPENDICES

Table 1a

Federal Government Investment (Complete Ownership) in Manufacturing And Construction Companies As At 1984

Name of Company	Total Investment (₦)	Percentage Holding (%)
1. Ajaokuta Steel Company	1,653,599,866.0	100.0
2. Associated Ores Mining Co. Ltd.	500,000.0	100.0
3. Delta Steel Co. Ltd.	781,278,061.0	100.0
4. Federal Superphosphate Fertilizer Co. Ltd.	27,419,533.0	100.0
5. National Film Distribution Co. Ltd.	400,000.0	100.0
6. National Root Crops Production Co. Ltd.	1,200,800.0	100.0
7. National Salt Company of National Ltd.	9,500,000.0	100.0
8. New Nigeria Salt Company Ltd.	16,500,000.0	100.0
9. Newsprint Nigeria Co. Ltd.	117,622,682.0	100.0
10. Nigerian Paper Mills Ltd.	97,000,000.0	100.0
11. Steel Rolling Mills Ltd. Jos	147,395,261.0	100.0
12. Steel Rolling Mill Ltd, Katsina	199,645,307.0	100.0
13. West African Distillers Ltd.	200,000.0	100.0
14. Steel Rolling Mills Ltd, Osogbo	199,895,678.0	100.0
<i>Sub-total</i>	3,132,156,388.0	

Source: (i) A. O. Sanda (ed) Privatization: The Nigerian Experience (forthcoming).
(ii) Ministry of Finance Incorporated Lagos.

Table 1b

Federal Government Investment (Dominant Share Holding) In Manufacturing And Construction Companies As At 1984

Name of Company	Total Investment (₦)	Percentage Holding (%)
1. New Nigeria Newspaper Ltd.	4,600,000.0	99.09
2. Suntti Sugar Company Ltd.	3,168,500.0	90.0
3. Nigerian Machine Tools Ltd.	18,072,043.0	85.0
4. Ashaka Cement Co. Ltd.	36,000,000.0	72.0
5. Aba Textiles Mills Ltd.	10,500,000.0	70.0
6. Calabar Cement Co. Ltd.	6,000,000.0	68
7. National Fish Co. Ltd.	11,150,000.0	66
8. Nigeria National Paper Man. Co. Ltd.	121,190,900.0	64.03
9. Electricity Metres Co. Ltd.	2,700,000.0	60.0
10. Impresit Bakolori Nig. Ltd.	3,000,000.0	60.0
11. Nigerian Engineering Const. Co. Ltd.	3,000,000.0	60.0
12. Road Construction Co. Nig. Ltd.	1,200,000.0	60.0
13. Specomill Textile Ltd.	2,400,000.0	60.0
14. Central Package Nig. Ltd.	450,000.0	59.0
15. National Livestock Prod. Co.	2,515,000.0	55.5
16. National Grains Production Co.	11,130,000.0	55.05
17. National Shrimp Co. Nig. Ltd.	2,068,000.0	51.0
18. Nigeria Yeast & Alcohol Man. Co. Ltd.	573,750.0	51.0
19. National Breweries Ltd.	7,500,000.0	50.0
20. Nig. Beverages Prod. Co. Yola	2,500,000.0	50.0
<i>Sub-total</i>	2,497,181,930.0	

Source: (i) A. O. Sanda (ed) Privatization: The Nigerian Experience (forthcoming).
(ii) Ministry of Finance Incorporated Lagos.

Table 1c

Federal Government Investment (Dominant/Significant Minority Share Holding) In Manufacturing and Construction Companies As At 1984

Name of Company	Total Investment (₦)	Percentage Holding (%)
1. Benue Cement Co. Ltd.	20,680,000.0	39.0
2. Volkswagen of Nigeria Ltd.	6,002,500.0	35.0
3. Steyr Nigeria Ltd.	7,385,000.0	35.0
4. Peugeot Automobile Nig. Ltd.	5,250,000.0	35.0
5. Opobo Boatyard Co. Ltd.	90,000.0	35.0
6. National Trucks Nigeria Ltd.	7,000,000.0	35.0
7. Leyland of Nigeria Ltd.	5,250,000.0	35.0
8. Anambra Motor Manu. Co. Ltd.	8,400,000.0	35.0
9. Cement Co. of Northern Nig. Ltd.	7,440,000.0	31.53
10. Nigerian Mining Corporation	150,000,000.0	27.0
11. National Fertilizer Co. Ltd.	182,333,112.0	27.0
12. Nigerian Romanjan Wood Co. Ltd.	3,000,000.0	25.0
13. Savanna Sugar Col Ltd.	47,120,000.0	22.50
14. Seronwood Ind. Ltd. Calabar	2,440,000.0	20.0
15. West African Portland Cement Co. Ltd.	18,000,000.0	20.0
<i>Sub-total</i>	3,947,106,128.0	

Source: (i) A. O. Sanda (ed) Privatization: The Nigerian Experience (forthcoming)
(ii) Ministry of Finance Incorporated Lagos.

Table 1d

Federal Government Investment (Negligible/Minority Shareholding) In Manufacturing and Construction Companies

Name of Company	Total Investment (₦)	Percentage Holding (%)
1. Nigerian Sugar Company Ltd.	1,970,106.0	19.0
2. Flour Mills of Nigeria Ltd.	3,000,000.0	12.0
3. Nigerian Cement Co. Ltd. Nkalagu	1,350,360.0	10.72
4. Nichemtex Industry Ltd.	1,200,000.0	10.0
5. Dunlop Industries Ltd.	350,000.0	3.03
<i>Sub-total</i>	7,870,466.0	

Source: (i) A. O. Sanda (ed) Privatization: The Nigeria Experience (forthcoming)
(ii) Ministry of Finance Incorporated, Lagos.

Table
Federal Government Investments In Financial Institutions/Banks
As At December, 1984

Name of Company	Original Investments	Additional Contribution & Bonus Issues	Total Investment	Holding %
1. Agricultural Credit Guarantee Scheme Fund	51,844,000	—	51,844,000	60
2. Allied Bank of Nigeria Ltd.	3,570,200	510,200	4,080,400	60
3. Central Bank of Nigeria	3,000,000	—	3,000,000	100
4. Chase Merchant Bank Nig. Ltd.	975,000	4,137,000	5,112,000	60
5. Federal Mortgage Bank Ltd.	90,000,000	—	90,000,000	100
6. First Bank of Nigeria Ltd.	13,692,399	13,670,606	27,363,005	44.8
7. International Bank for West Africa Ltd.	6,000,000	12,000,000	18,000,000	50
8. International Merchant Bank Ltd.	1,895,000	1,905,000	3,800,000	60
9. Merchant Bank of Africa Nig. Ltd.	803,000	—	303,000	5
10. Nig. Agric. Co-operative Bank Ltd.	90,000,000	—	90,000,000	60
11. NAL Merchant Bankers' Nig. Ltd.	1,900,000	20,000	1,920,000	20
12. Nigerian Arab Bank Ltd.	1,500,000	2,700,000	4,200,000	60
13. Nig. Bank for Commerce & Industry	30,000,000	80,000,000	110,000,000	60
14. Nigerian Merchant Bank Ltd.	3,000,000	—	3,000,000	60
15. Nig. Indust. Development Bank Ltd.	59,000,000	59,007,500	118,007,500	59
16. Savannah Bank of Nig. Ltd.	3,982,000	3,361,750	14,343,750	60
17. Union Bank of Nigeria Ltd.	81,531,544	19,591,637	28,123,181	51.67
18. United Bank for Africa Nig. Ltd.	3,355,046	17,238,682	20,593,728	45.76
<i>Sub-total</i>	576,544,186	216,142,375	592,686,564	

Source: Ministry of Finance Incorporated, Lagos.

Table 3

Federal Government Investments In Financial Institutions/Insurance Companies
As At December, 1984

Name of Company	Original Investments	Additional Contribution & Bonus	Total Investments	Holding %
INSURANCE				
1. American International Ins. Co. Ltd.	490,000	98,000	588,000	49
2. British American Ins. Co. Ltd.	404,000	86,000	490,000	49
3. Crusader Ins. Company Ltd.	245,000	245,000	490,000	49
4. Guinea Ins. Company Ltd.	49,8422	155,224	205,066	24.82
5. Prestige Insurance Co. Ltd.	42,825	104,175	147,000	49
6. Law Union and Rock Ins. Co. Ltd.	78,200	156,400	234,600	30.10
7. Mercury Assurance Co. Ltd.	147,000	27,000	174,000	49
8. National Insurance Co. of Nig.	2,000,000	8,000,000	10,000,000	100
9. Nigerian Re-Insurance Co.	10,000,000	10,000,000	20,000,000	100
10. N. E. M. Insurance Co. Ltd.	98,010	49,006	147,016	47
11. Royal Exchange Ins. Co. Ltd.	564,004	1,128,004	1,692,008	49
12. Sun Insurance Co. Ltd.	122,500	1,569,508	1,692,008	48.08
13. United Nigeria Ins. Co. Ltd.	97,600	4,782,400	4,880,000	48.46
14. United Nigeria Ins. Co.	212,290	—	212,290	33.04
15. West African Provincial Ins. Co. Ltd.	100,200	—	100,200	49
<i>Sub-total</i>	14,651,471	26,400,717	41,052,188	

Source: Ministry of Finance Incorporated, Lagos.

Table 4

Federal Government Investment In Petroleum Prospecting, Refinery and Marketing

<i>N. N. P. C.</i>	<i>Cost of Investment</i>	<i>Current Value of Investment</i>	<i>% Holding</i>
1. Direct Exploration Activities	367,537,201	367,537,201	100%
2. Staff Quarters	942,000	942,000	100%
3. Distribution Pipelines	86,111,000	86,111,000	100%
4. Joint Venture Activities Interest Acquisition	273,818,000	273,818,000	55%
5. J. C. A. Ashland & Others	16,878,000	16,878,000	55%
6. J. V. A. Capital Fund	643,724,000	643,724,000	55%
7. J. V. A. National Oil Tankers	34,400,00	34,400,000	55%
8. Petroleum Training Institute	18,544,000	18,544,000	100%
9. Unipetrol-Marketing	6,990,000	6,990,000	100%
10. National Oil Chemical Marketing	10,970,000	10,970,000	100%
11. Warri Refinery	367,890,000	367,800,000	100%
12. Kaduna Refinery	66,600,000	66,600,000	100%
13. Liquidified Natural Gas Plant	2,658,000	2,658,000	100%
14. Storage Tanks for Petroleum products	63,850,000	63,850,000	100%
15. Skid Mounted Petroleum Products	112,396,000	112,396,000	100%
16. Sapele Gas Plant	7,800,000	7,800,000	100%
<i>Sub-Total</i>	2,081,018,201	2,081,018,201	

Source: Ministry of Finance Incorporated, Lagos.

Table 5

Federal Government Investment, Service Industries

<i>COMPANY</i>	<i>Cost of Initial Investment</i>	<i>Bonus or New Issues</i>	<i>Total Investment</i>	<i>%</i>
1. Niger Pools Co. Ltd.	160,000	—	160,000	100
2. Nigeria Hotels Ltd. L	3,984,011	1,903,000	5,887,011	51
3. Dubar Hotel	9,704,000	—	9,704,000	100
4. Tourist Co. of Nigeria	10,700,000	—	10,700,000	100
5. NET (Nigerian External Telecommunication)	2,000,000	—	2,000,000	100
6. National Supply Co. Nigeria Ltd.	25,000,000	—	25,000,000	100
7. Nigeria Security Printing and Mining Co.	5,280,000	—	5,280,000	55
8. Nigeria National Shipping Line	4,000,000	—	4,000,000	100
9. Nigerian National Press	2,000,000	—	2,000,000	100
10. National Freight Co. Ltd.	2,500,000	—	2,500,000	100
11. Central Water Transportation Co. Ltd.	1,912,000	—	1,912,000	100
12. Nigerian Railway Corporation	50,000,000	—	50,000,000	100
13. National Cargo Handling Co.	1,500,000	—	1,500,000	100
14. Nigeria Airways Corporation	3,054,800	—	3,054,800	100
15. National Electric Power Authority	256,267,000	—	256,267,000	100
16. Nigerian Ports Authority	108,789,034	—	108,789,034	100
17. Chad Basin Development Authority	150,834,074	—	150,834,074	100
18. Nigerian Television Authority	31,538,400	—	31,538,400	100
<i>Total</i>	669,123,339	1,903,000	671,026,339	

Source: Ministry of Finance Incorporated, Lagos.

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