Inaugural Lecture Series 66

REDISTRIBUTING POPULATION:
CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

By ADERANTI ADEPOJU

UNIVERSITY OF IFE PRESS
REDISTRIBUTING POPULATION: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

INTRODUCTION

The redistribution of population has long been a concern for policy makers, as evidenced by the series of conferences convened by the United Nations which recognized that it is greater concerns among countries of the world — particularly in developing and developing economies — than on any other population issue. According to the 10th Population Conference (1984), 27 per cent of the world's 44 per cent had more than 50 per cent of the population living in urban areas.

ADERANTI ADEPOJU

Professor of Demography and Social Statistics

An analysis of internal migration as a serious problem in Nigeria, in 1976, also showed that 27 per cent considered it a serious problem in the distribution of population. An analysis of 114 developing nations in 1976 also showed that 27 per cent considered it a serious problem in the distribution of population. An analysis of 114 developing nations in 1976 also showed that 27 per cent considered the spatial distribution of population a serious problem.

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In Africa, where misallocation of population poses tremendous planning problems, understandably no country considered the prevailing pattern of population distribution acceptable and only 27 per cent considered it partly acceptable. By far, an overwhelming majority of the countries (83 per cent) considered it inappropriate (Table 1). This perception coincides sharply with the reaction to the ICIH study which found that 60 per cent of the world's population lived in urban areas. The 27 per cent included in the study were those who lived in rural areas.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The redistribution of population is of immense concern to policy makers as confirmed by the series of enquiries undertaken by the United Nations which conclude that there is greater consensus among countries of the world—both developing and developed—on population distribution than on any other population issue. According to the fourth Population Enquiry, 1978, 88 per cent of the world's countries regarded the prevailing population distribution and internal migration as a serious problem in contrast to 51 and 49 per cent, respectively, in respect of natural population growth and fertility. An earlier survey among 114 developing nations in 1976 also showed that 83 per cent considered the spatial distribution of their population significantly unacceptable (UN., 1980; Nelson, 1983).

In Africa, where mal-distributed population poses tremendous planning problems, understandably no country considered the prevailing spatial population distribution acceptable and only 27 per cent considered it partly appropriate. By far, an overwhelming majority of the countries (73 per cent) considered it inappropriate (Table 1). This perception contrasts sharply with the reaction to the growth rate of the population where 60 per cent of the countries considered the prevailing rates acceptable; or with respect to fertility, rated satisfactory by 50 per cent of African governments. Indeed, the "irrational population distribution" is a crucial demographic problem in Africa next to morbidity (poor health) and mortality (low life expectancy).
Hence, today, I am addressing myself to a topic of top policy priority, but nevertheless a neglected area of research for, as Goldstein in his presidential address to the Population Association of America in 1976 observed:

The study of redistribution has suffered far too long from neglect within the profession, within government agencies responsible for data collection, within foundations and other groups responsible for funding research, and among those responsible for planning the future and anticipating the consequences of their plans for the welfare of their people. It behooves us to rectify this situation in this last quarter of the twentieth century, when redistribution in all of its facets will undoubtedly constitute a major, and increasingly important component of demographic change... (Goldstein, 1976: 433).

Conceptually, redistribution refers to changes in the spatial distribution of population resulting from differential natural growth (via mortality and fertility differentials between areas) and migration — both internal and international. It is a dynamic concept, implying changes in the distributional pattern over time, hence the need to identify the causes of these changes and more importantly to study their impact, which have political, economic, social and demographic dimensions (Kosinski, 1978).

The prevailing population distribution derives from past trends in mortality, migration and fertility — the three key parameters of population change and the pillars of demography. Of these, migration exerts both the fastest and the strongest impact on population distribution and redistribution and is rightly regarded as the "disturbing" factor in the planning process.

The analytical study of population redistribution and migration per se is a demographic venture; however the
consequences of government policies on population redistribution raise issues of international relations between nations and fundamental human rights especially with regard to refugees, expulsion of aliens, and in situations where direct government policies force or police migrants to specific locations, raising issues of equity and breach of human rights. Differential growth of ethnic, social and religious groups in multi-ethnic plural societies can be politically sensitive and an attempt to influence this through the moderation of the growth rate or redistributive strategies is normally resisted. Such is the disparage aspect of this topic that the narrow demographic approach is neither feasible nor appropriate.

For the next one hour, I will be wearing a multi-coloured cap of demography denoting the interrelated disciplines of social anthropology, social statistics, economics, population geography, psychology, and sociology. This is indeed a devil’s cap but I will try to make some sense out of the confusion. Economics, we are reminded, deals with how people make choices; sociology concerns why they do not have any choice to make. Economists in dealing with migration, explore the process of human capital formation, its effectiveness in labour allocation, the cost and benefits for areas of origin and destination and implications for economic growth at both macro and micro levels. The central concern of sociologists is with the underlying social structures and how they shape people’s mobility intentions: the life cycle and occupational career maps which inhibit or promote movement under various influences, the attendant anomalies, and the adaptation processes of migrants to the urban social milieu (Morrison, 1972).

Demographers and statisticians on their part are primarily concerned with numbers, tables and models — and this is precisely what I want to avoid in this presentation. The demographer subsists by calculating rates, assuming implicitly a decision-making process regarding when, where, how many and how far in-between to have babies; by explaining birth interval by post-partum amenorrhea, voluntary abstinence, contraceptive use-effectiveness, period of infecundability and related fertility-inhibiting indicators; by constructing elegant life tables; by measuring activity rates and migration rates and by periodically projecting the size of the total population by its components; by validating and updating his results usually presented in three variants — high, medium and low — using census figures (where available) and vital registration (where these exist). Such is the life of a demographer.

The statistician, a child of figures, is keen on amassing data for the government. As Sir Josiah Stamp of the Inland Revenue Department in England comically put it in 1896, the statistician collects data or statistics, “adds them, raises them to the ‘nth’ power, takes the cube root and prepares wonderful diagrams.” “But” — he cautioned — “you must never forget that everyone of these figures come in the first instance from the village watchman, who just puts down what he damn pleases.”

In the meantime, geographers occupy themselves almost always with drawing and reconstructing new area maps, depicting new human enclaves and boundary adjustments, using arrows to indicate directions and trends in human mobility. By confining himself to selected indicators — industrialization, labour mobility, the probability of being employed, disguised unemployment — the economist elevates the migrant to the rank of the chief actor in the complex industrialization — urbanization — development interrelations spectrum.
The policy maker, faced with the sudden massive exodus of rural dwellers to the towns which are least prepared to accommodate them, wades through his dust-smoked files to find ready-made “rule of thumb” answers to control, if he cannot stop, the volume and tempo of migration and modify the direction of the migratory movements. Sometimes, he turns, in uncertain hope and despair, to demographers, sociologists, statisticians, geographers and economists who are equally confused and bewildered, for help (UNESCO, 1983).

The ultimate objective in searching for a balance between population distribution and resources is development, viewed differently across disciplines. To the economist, development implies economic growth or industrialization; to the sociologist, structural differentiation, dislocation and integration; and to the political scientist, the extent, or better still, the increase in the capacity of political agencies, political unification and political participation. The psychologist’s central concern is with the changes in the character of individuals rather than the society – as epitomised by concepts such as self-reliance, achievement-orientation and the like (Oh, 1973). The demographer religiously adheres to the theory of vital or demographic transition which is linked to social change, urbanization and mobility (Pryor, 1982), refined and adapted by Zelinsky in formulating his mobility transition theory (Zelinsky, 1971). In all these approaches, the main actor is man in his strive for socio-economic mobility.

II. AFRICA: A SURVEY

This lecture is primarily confined to Africa, a continent of great diversity in history, culture, socio-political system, population size and land area, ecology, level and style of development: a region, until recently cynically described as a dark continent even by renowned pseudo-historians; a continent potentially the richest in natural resources (with 60 per cent of the world’s cocoa, 85 per cent of the platinum, 64 per cent of the manganese, 75 per cent of the diamonds, 70 per cent of the gold and colbalt, 25 per cent of the uranium, 13 per cent of copper, 50 per cent of palm oil production, 33 per cent of coffee production (Kingue, 1981) to list a few. These are no doubt signs of hope, but in reality Africa is the poorest region in the world where 72 per cent of the world’s poorest countries are located. It is a continent demographically the most backward whose population, spread over a quarter of the world’s land area, accounts for only 11 per cent of the world’s total in 1983. It is also a continent with a history of intensive and devastating colonial domination by various Western powers, a continent whose extremely fragmented micro states have been incarcerated and rendered impotent in world power tussle but nevertheless a continent of the future whose youths, who constitute half of the 516 million inhabitants in mid-1983, could transform it into a self-sustaining region were they to face the future with determination, courage and dedication. Above all, it is the region most familiar to me through research and travels, and where I had the privilege of serving as Africa’s first Regional Adviser on population and labour policy for the International Labour Organization.

The majority of African countries still remain economically dependent on the colonial and other super powers, two decades after attaining political independence, sometimes under very challenging situation. In the meantime, the hopes and aspirations of Africans remain unfulfilled indeed shattered as few have attained the level of socio-economic well-being promised by politicians due to a complex internal and external factors. Recently, food shortage, galloping inflation, political instability, rising
unemployment now plague the continent. The catalogue of ills is indeed alarming: mass illiteracy, very low income, malnutrition, low life expectancy, and impending famine.

Africa's position with respect to other world regions is the weakest in all sectors: no doubt, it is the most backward, accounting for just 1 per cent of the world's industrial production and regrettably food production in spite of abundant land resources. The per capita income is the lowest in the world and Africa can hardly feed, educate, and provide adequate shelter and remunerative jobs for its rapidly increasing population. The situation is complicated by a series of internal strife (often internationalised), natural disasters, drought and famine which literally render the continent a beggar for aid (Kingue, 1981).

Heavy reliance on mono-products - copper in Zambia, groundnut in Senegambia, oil in Nigeria, cocoa in Ghana etc. - readily renders African countries highly vulnerable to fluctuations in the world market prices thus making their export earnings uncertain and precarious. Her natural resources - minerals, water, forests, sun and wildlife - are Africa's valuable and inadequately tapped assets which again are unevenly distributed and benefit the developed countries and their multinationals. On top of these problems, or correctly deriving from them, are the demographic pressures of rapidly increasing population. The situation is complicated by a series of internal strife (often internationalised), natural disasters, drought and famine which literally render the continent a beggar for aid (Kingue, 1981).

As of 1983, Africa is the most feebly urbanized of the world's regions: less than 30 per cent of the population live in urban areas. The steady rise in this proportion - from 15 per cent in 1950 - is impressive and is projected to reach 42 per cent by the end of this century (U.N., 1980). In contrast to the low level of urbanization, the annual growth rate of urban areas of 5 per cent is about the highest in the world, and has been sustained by high rate of natural increase and accelerated city-ward migration from rural areas and small towns. Thus, Africa is a rural continent, in which case, the nature and direction of population growth is dictated largely by the highly skewed population distribution in favour of rural areas where the population still grows at 2 per cent per annum.

Africa's population is very young: about 48 per cent is under age 15, reflecting the past high and increasing fertility - the major determinant of the age structure at the macro level. The population, estimated at 486 million by mid 1981, increased by 30 million to 516 million by June 1983, and is expected to reach 813 million by the year 2000. This rapid increase has been sustained by an annual growth rate of close to 3 per cent - the highest of the world's regions in contrast to the world's growth rate of 1.8 per cent during 1982-83. According to the Economic Commission for Africa, this seemingly frigh-
### Table 2

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<th>Population Size (Millions)</th>
<th>AFRICA</th>
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<th>WORLD</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Under 0.5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>1,530</td>
<td>0.3</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>3,553</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>46,850</td>
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<td>6 - 10</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24.1</td>
<td>89,834</td>
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<td>11 - 15</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>40,233</td>
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<td>5.5</td>
<td>80,338</td>
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<td>21 - 29</td>
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<td>1.9</td>
<td>22,889</td>
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<td>30 - 39</td>
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<td>5.5</td>
<td>99,493</td>
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<td>40 - 49</td>
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<td>50 - 100</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>85,219</td>
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<th>Population Size (000s)</th>
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<td>All Countries</td>
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Over the past two decades, but more definitely the last decade, infant and general mortality has been declining. This is in response to the public sector investment in health programmes, enhanced environmental sanitation, personal hygiene and general living conditions buttressed by other contributory factors such as the eradication of some common communicable and infectious diseases which have considerably reduced morbidity, and enhanced life expectancy.

Fertility has always remained high, initially to compensate for the low survival of children. The peculiar social and economic structures of African societies have sustained high fertility. This situation, we argued strongly in one of our publications (Adepoju, 1977) calls for a systematic understanding of the institutions which fostered and still sustain the high fertility norm at the micro household level.

Migration is more dynamic as a person may change residence over time and space several times or, at the extreme and the least likely, may remain in the same location over the life cycle. Its measurement is intricate, being causally related to almost all aspects of society. Thus, Dudley Kirk (1968) maintained that demography has “its greatest successes in the analysis of mortality. Its greatest interest and virtuosity had been in the study of natality. The stepchild of demography is migration which up till now has defied the application of refined measurements comparable to those developed in the other two fields”.

For so long, the decision to migrate has been explained in terms of individual motivations and characteristics. Recent developments now show that in Africa as in Latin America, this is a household rather than an individual decision-making process. As we illustrate in Fig. 1, the broad structural changes especially the level and form of development, the socio-economic and environmental factors and how these differentially affect social groups, cultural and socio-psychological factors at the macro and micro levels of the society, households and individuals, have become pertinent to the study of migration.
I submit that autogenic (voluntary, rational) migration flows and allogenic (non-voluntary) migration induced by a force outside the control of the individual are conceptually and analytically reinforcing concepts. Apart from the mass movement of refugees caused by war, natural disaster etc., which are allogenic factors, the so-called voluntary migration is in some cases compelled movement especially if one further distinguishes between ‘survival’ and ‘mobility’ strategy types. While the decision-making process of mobility migrants is expected to approximate the model of economic rationality, survival migrants search for whatever work they can get, in any location, and at any wage, usually below the ruling market rate. Fig. 1 illustrates a simplified migration decision-making process.

The model of migration, both as a major component of population distribution and determinant or consequence of economic development does not assume a clear pattern in the African context because of a number of external forces which have disrupted severely Africa's social, political and economic history. Hence, we have developed a different conceptual approach for two major considerations. First, African societies have undergone various periods and often different forms of colonization, and in the process, the pattern, motivations and consequences of migration are drastically different from the experience of the Western world from which most of the theories of migration in relation to development originate and largely apply. Secondly, and more importantly, in spite of the apparently distinct phases of African history — the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial era — migration in Africa assumes a considerable measure both of diversity and continuity but the migration literature wrongly assumes a large measure of homogeneity of migration behaviour over the different parts of the continent. Because the economic, social, cultural, demographic and colonial experiences have differed, so do the pattern and motivations of migration and population distribution which have been largely influenced by these factors. Hence we attempt to link the study of contemporary migration and population distribution with historical process and patterns (Adepoju 1977).

Political and economic historians and paleo-demographers remind us that the slave trade — involving millions of Africans — laid a bold and lasting imprint on the size, growth and distribution of the population of the area most acutely affected, especially the middle belt countries of West Africa, Gabon, Angola, Northern Sudan and marked the beginning of inter-continental (forced) migration in Africa. Not being an historian of any description, I can be spared the details of this phenomenon. The demographic effects of the slave trade were however enormous: As Egero (1977) succinctly put it:

The slave trade was a way of stripping Africa of its adult men and women. Its demographic impact was severe to say the least, reducing for instance the population of Angola to perhaps half its original size. This was a reduction from which the population could not readily recover; those from whom the next generations should come, the young men and women, were the first target of the slave traders. As disruptions in the food production led to famine and starvation, mortality increased to very high levels. . . .

The result was sparse population of the affected areas in the years that followed the abolition of the slave trade. The political history of colonialism in Africa left in its trail a highly skewed population distribution pattern through the allocation of land, especially in east and southern Africa where the impact of colonial settlement is
most pronounced. In East and Central Africa, a variety of economic policies were used to induce workers of the required quality and quantity to the mines and plantations (Adepoju, 1983). In Kenya particularly, the scramble for land and the laws that apportioned the fertile highland — the “scheduled areas” and “white highlands” — to white settlers created a mass of dispossessed landless natives. The unproductive, and inadequate, land in the “tribal reserves” and the need to obtain money to pay the newly imposed hut taxes literally forced the males to migrate to the towns and European commercial farms in search of wage employment. Hence, population distribution varied considerably, being lowest in the plantation areas and white settler zones and highest in the native reserves.

In 1968, at the time of independence in Swaziland, 45 per cent of the land was owned by the white settlers for large plantations. Ten years later in 1978, up to 17 per cent of the land was still owned by expatriates. In Zambia, about 3 million hectares of fertile land were alienated to expatriate farmers while the natives were moved into the “reserves” created in 1928-29 (Mulenga and Mubanga, 1980). In South Africa, the policy of separate development is unique and involves the creation of homelands and arbitrary allocation of 70 per cent of the population to a mere 13 per cent of the territory, which includes the poorest land.

The sustained period of economic and political domination of Africa by colonial governments has greatly influenced the pattern and strategy of economic development. Perhaps the most visible result is the dualistic nature of development evidenced in the polarization of the urban/industrial and rural/agricultural sectors and the imbalances in income and related opportunities between and within these sectors.

Shortly after political independence, national governments started building upon the foundations of the colonial development strategy. Investment in industry, commerce, administration, and especially post-primary educational institutions and social amenities were heavily, and in a number of countries, solely concentrated in the major towns. Thus, increasingly, the economies of African countries began to show signs of the uneasy coexistence between the agricultural (low productivity) and the industrial (relatively high income) sectors. The export-oriented development path, the complete dependence on imported technology, machinery and equipment, developed by and for the highly industrialised economy, and the concentration of massive investment in a few cities was a major cause of regional inequality. As a result, the location of productive activities virtually determines the intensity, pattern, direction — sometimes the timing — of migration (Adepoju, 1978).

If migration is a response to economic incentives arising largely from disequilibria between urban and rural labour markets and within different regions, then we should ask the obvious questions: in what ways and to what extent has migration responded to such apparent disequilibria? Our conclusion — and there is no consensus on this — that migration is a rational economic behaviour and that people move to maximize economic gains would suggest that the greater the differences in economic opportunities between sectors and regions of a country, the greater. ceteris paribus, the flow of migrants from poorer to richer areas, discounted, as it were, by intervening obstacles — distance, contact, information flows, risk averseness etc. (Todaro, 1969; Adepoju, 1977).

A review of the development plans of African countries over a 15-year period and published in our paper, “Migr-
Migration can appropriately be perceived as a link, and often a strong one, in the process of socio-economic change in the sense that it involves changes in other subsystems of the society. It is determined by and results in changes, or is a concomitant of changes. One such area of the sub-system, at present a topical issue in Africa, is the relationship between fertility, migration, population distribution and development.

The direct contribution to (urban) population growth by primary and follow-up migrants appears fairly clear, or at least measurable. The measurement of the relative contribution of migrants to population growth is complex if one were to correctly disaggregate fertility before and after the migration and compare the latter — controlled by age at and duration of marriage, duration of residence, current age, etc. — with those of non-migrants at the destination. Apparently, the methodological bottleneck has not been satisfactorily resolved in the few surveys that so far address this issue in Africa (Adepoju, 1977; 1983). Not surprisingly, the evidence on migrant/non-migrant fertility differentials is inconclusive and contradictory, due to the varying levels of specificity of the measuring instruments, survey objectives and analytical techniques. Nevertheless, a number of studies by Olusanya, Anker, Gaisie, Adepoju, etc. indicate that urban fertility is higher than rural fertility, and that migrants have higher fertility than non-migrants. A few studies conclude to the contrary.

Our contribution to this debate is based on a series of surveys in medium sized towns in Nigeria (Ife, Oshogbo, Abeokuta, Ilorin, Warri, Calabar). The results controlled for the women’s age, age at marriage, marriage duration, level of formal education and husband’s income and showed that migrants had slightly higher mean CEB (children ever born) than non-migrants. However, we
quickly cautioned in the ensuing publication (Adepoju, 1977) that the origin rather than migration status of the women per se is the important explanatory variable. We also established that women's level of formal education and income of their husbands are additional explanatory variables.

It should be recalled that Africa's towns consist mainly of young persons, including migrants, in the prime of both reproductive and working life who contribute indirectly and importantly to urban fertility by initially importing their rural reproductive norms to the cities before the process of assimilation to the urban milieu matures. Besides, where migrants are socially mobile, the potential fertility and survival opportunities for children are enhanced, in both cases increasing the fertility of migrants in post, compared to pre-migration situation. Thus in 1979, natural increase constituted the dominant feature of urban population growth in African countries (being 61 percent). In the developed countries, only 40 percent derived from natural growth.

A paradox of African demography is the juxtaposition of pockets of infertility and low population growth rate between regions of very high fertility and population growth. Three categories of infertility are distinguished: primary infertility, secondary infertility and pregnancy wastage. Demographers also distinguish between sub-fertility and infertility.

As depicted in Fig 2, the highest levels of childlessness are found in three zones of contiguous regions in two countries: south-west Sudan and northwestern Cameroon and Gabon; and southeastern Angola and northeastern Zambia. Along with one small area of Upper Volta and Buganda Province of Uganda all these areas have reported levels of terminal childlessness ranging from over 21 percent to 40 percent. Other zones are in Mozambique, northwest Tanzania, and southeast Niger. The causes of infertility, experts argue, include genetic and metabolic factors, psychological disorders and other pathological sources (e.g. tuberculosis, microfilariasis), but in Africa, it has been suggested, but not firmly established, that gonorrhea through tubal infection and occlusion in women is the main cause (Frank, 1983).
The widespread infertility and subfertility in Central Africa especially, is a potent factor in the sluggish rate of population growth of the sub-region. This in turn shapes the perception of governments with respect to population distribution and policies designed to influence it. Thus, these governments have maintained consistently that the fertility level is too low and opt for higher growth rate. Obviously, a viable and acceptable population policy lies in efforts to reduce infertility and boost the growth rate.

Again, on migration, the subtle distinction between internal and international (intra-continental) migration in Africa have both historical and political aspects: historically, people have, over the ages, moved freely as pastoralists, nomads, traders, pilgrims, perhaps in a less structured way, all over the continent. Africans have moved, actually wandered freely over time and space: at the beginning, on their legs; later, they rode on their animals – camels, donkeys and all. With improvements ushered in by science and technology, caravans, boats, trains and automobile became accessible and have considerably facilitated movements over long distances (UNESCO, 1983). Now in the jet age, aeroplanes, concord type, virtually closed the physical distance hitherto separating parts of this planet earth.

Analytically, international migration can be considered part of a process of internal migration especially where borders arbitrarily divide homogeneous ethnic, cultural and economic units. African countries provide a unique example. In our most recent publication (Adepoju, 1983), we maintain that what is statistically regarded as international migration in Africa is analytically, indeed conceptually, movement between areas of contrasting opportunities; that both internal and international migration derive from a set of common structural processes and that the relocation process of international migrants at the destination quite resembles that of internal migrants. The disparities in employment and related opportunities between neighbouring countries, reinforced by the formation of economic unions – the defunct East Africa Community and now ECOWAS – have in the first example, for a long time facilitated free movement of persons across and within the member states of such communities, sometimes legitimising, if only temporarily, hitherto undocumented, illegal migrations, or migrants in an irregular situation, who compete with the nationals for the limited opportunities. That the magnitude of this migration is unknown is not surprising: these countries rely on guesstimates even for their respective national population. Nigeria is a unique example: when aliens were expelled in January 1983, the estimate of illegal migrants in the country ranged from one to three million (Adepoju, 1983c).

Nomads are a special group: in Somalia, about two-thirds of the population live a nomadic or semi-nomadic life while eleven per cent of Sudan's population were nomads in 1973. In both countries, and over a large part of the Sahelian region – Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Upper Volta, Niger and Chad – nomads maintain a wide spatial mobility in search of water and pasture in defiance of international boundaries since the ecological requirements of their flock cannot be met in one location throughout the year.

Refugee migration has perhaps become the most dramatic but unpredictable element of population redistribution in Africa in the last decade. According to Salas (1982), "the movement of refugees across national borders is an unplanned, abrupt and often traumatic element of international migration." Thus, I agree perfectly with Olopade's (1983) contention that "refugee movement and resettlement may be viewed as a special type of population redistribution..." however, refugees differ from other migrants in that they
have been forced under trying circumstances to leave their homeland. This is an autogenic factor – an involuntary group migration. In recent years the movement of refugees has become a critical factor in population distribution in Africa, especially in the Horn: Sudan, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia.

In three publications (Adepoju, 1982a, 1982d, 1983d), Initially presented to expert group meetings, we traced the origin of mass refugee migration in Africa to the war of liberation in Algeria in the 50s. By 1960 there were an estimated 700,000 refugees in Africa. The number increased rapidly, reaching 5 million in 1981 at that time, every other refugee in the world was in Africa; within the continent, one in every 75 persons was a refugee.

It is not the sheer magnitude of refugees and internally displaced persons but rather their concentration in a few countries, and the frail economies of countries of origin and asylum that pose severe redistribution problems. By December 1982 when there were 6 million refugees and internally displaced persons in Africa, 1,540,000 were located in Somalia, 490,000 in Sudan, and 1,811,000 in Ethiopia. In the first of these three countries, Somalia, one in every three persons is a refugee. In Djibouti, the ratio is 1:8; in Ethiopia, 1:17; and in Sudan, 1:36.

Eight of the world’s twelve countries with the highest proportion of refugees to the local population in 1981, are in Africa – Somalia, Djibouti, Burundi, Cameroon, Sudan, Swaziland, Zaire and Angola. These are among the poorest countries in the world, and are also plagued by famine, drought, internal strife and political instability. These refugees make up the population of eight African countries in 1983 (Gambia, Seychelles, Western Sahara, Swaziland, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea Bissau and Comoro) and severely distort existing population distribution, further exacerbating ecological deterioration. Such is the magnitude of unplanned population redistribution induced by refugee migration in Africa forced on the countries immediately bordering the scene of war and other forms of man-made disaster.

We submit that the vulnerability of African countries, especially the land-locked countries and the Sahel region, to ecological problems and the increasing wave of armed conflicts and oppression are fluid and highly unpredictable hence the refugee situation is sadly likely to remain a thorny problem in Africa throughout the 1980s (Adepoju, 1982d).

IV. POLICIES

As ter Heide and Fichperger (1978) noted: “the development of theory to assist in the understanding of population redistribution policies should fulfill a dual function: the explanation of population distribution policies and providing rational foundations for the formulation of population redistribution policies.” Generally, population redistribution policy and migration policy are often, and are in this case, used interchangeably. The redistribution of population involves the relation of people in space by altering the destination of migration to meet the objectives of policy goals through incentives or disincentives, persuasion or coercive measures. Migration policies are normally addressed to the three major actors – the area of origin and destination simultaneously or selectively, and the migrant. Figure 3 provides a simplified scheme for policy implementation.

A strategy mix of direct controls and inducements have been used to effect the desired population redistribution programmes and policies. These include residence permits, moral suasion, forced return or eviction to rural areas. The strategy type, implementation mechanism and
the expected results are conditioned largely by the type of political structures, available manpower resources and finance, extent of government commitment and the involvement by the target population. Although positive inducements are sometimes supplemented by negative disincentives, the relocation of public sector activities directly under government control tends to be more effectively implemented than similar programmes aimed at the private sector investment which in African countries are dominated by multinational corporations. Direct controls require, on the other hand, "a combination of strong, stable, authoritarian regime and considerable administrative competence" (Nelson, 1983) and are feasible under restricted circumstances (see Fig. 3).

Paul Demeny (1975) outlined four elements essential for a proper formulation of population policies, which embrace population redistribution policy: an understanding of demographic processes in a descriptive sense; of the antecedents of demographic behaviour, notably the causal relationships that determine population processes; of the impact of population processes; and an evaluation of the welfare significance -- costs and benefits -- of conceivable policy interventions. Viewed in this way, interest in population redistribution policy reflects the concerns about the rapidly growing urban populations and measures aimed at arresting such growth by deflecting attention to smaller urban places or growth centres; retaining potential migrants in rural areas; or resettling migrants in rural areas (Richardson, 1983).

McWhinnie argues that there are two readily identifiable components to the concern with redistribution of population: the location, massing and settle-
set in development plans which are assumed to be linked to rapid population growth, the maldistribution between population and opportunities for a more productive use of both human capital and material resources. In general, redistribution policy is an integral part of population policy which in turn constitutes part of social and economic development (Whitney, 1983).

Gosling (1979) also proposed a typology of levels of government intervention in the freedom of people to move or not to move ranging from spontaneous, managed, sponsored to compulsory redistribution. While spontaneous redistribution involves no direct government intervention or planning in either area sending or receiving migrants, managed redistribution is effected through intervention in either the sending and/or the receiving areas through a series of selective policies. Sponsored redistribution involves linked government intervention whereby a specific group or class of people is induced to move from one area to another. At the end of the spectrum is compulsory redistribution where people are actually forced to move from one location to another. This typology reinforces the strategy types outlined by Deskins and Clarke (1979) as follows: ameliorative problem solving: allocative trend modifying: multiple goal satisfaction strategies.

In 1981 we carried out an extensive review of redistribution policies in Africa and concluded that few countries with distinctively maldistributed populations have in fact adopted vigorous and effective policies to modify the prevailing configuration of settlement patterns, in spite of the widespread concern with their undesirable spatial population distribution (see also Mabogunje, 1981). Table 3 summarises the types of redistribution policies (direct and indirect) which have been advocated and sometimes implemented. Two policy types: urban and rural oriented strategies have featured in African countries. Five urban-oriented strategies have been pursued in Africa: the closed city programmes to prevent in-migration as in South Africa: urban rustication or forced return to rural areas as in Somalia and Mozambique: dispersed urbanization (Senegal, Nigeria): decentralization through medium-sized city, growth pole and regional development (Algeria) and creation of new capitals (Nigeria and Tanzania).

Among the rural-oriented strategies frontier colonization of marginal land, and sedentarization of nomads (Sudan, Uganda and Ethiopia): resettlement and redistribution of colonised lands (Kenya and Algeria); capital intensive agricultural development programmes; large scale dams (Ghana, Sudan, Nigeria): integrated/comprehensive
### Table 3

Types of population redistribution policies in selected African Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Rural development</th>
<th>Resettlement schemes</th>
<th>Youth programmes</th>
<th>Growth poles, administrative decentralisation</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chilabo (1967)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Wolamo (1970)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ada (1972)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Agric Development Units</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Awash Valley Scheme</td>
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<td>Ghana</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Volta Dam Resettlement Scheme (1964): 82,000 people</td>
<td>Workers Brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>Special Development Programme (1971)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Resettlement schemes (1962): 51,766 families; Land Redistribution (8000 settlers)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>Integrated Rural Development (1975)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Farm Settlement Scheme (1961): 46,000 settlers; Sawcie Corps Settlement Scheme (1964): 5,000 settlers; Kainji Lake Resettlement Scheme (1963): 4,300 persons, 12,500 workers</td>
<td>Nation Youth Workers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>Integrated Rural Development (1972)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Note:**

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**Source:** Adepoju, 1982
rural development (Tanzania) and resettlement for strategic and political reasons (Algeria) are popular. It is obvious that the choice of strategy type, target population, goals, implementation mechanism and success of these policies is closely related to the prevailing political structures, and available resources.

In our paper, "Population Redistribution in Tropical Africa: A Review of Governmental Policies" (1982), we indicated that the end of colonial rule drastically altered the spatial distribution of population. The emergence, since the sixties, of independent nation states; the setting up and recently the enforcement, even if inconsistently, of border control regulations governing immigration by national governments; the introduction of national currencies; and the requirement for travellers to obtain travel documents; these are some of the constraining mechanisms to control the erstwhile free migration in various parts of the continent especially within areas formerly under similar colonial administrators.

In countries like Zambia, Tanzania, Swaziland and Kenya, national governments repealed the discriminatory laws and redistributed land more equitably. In Kenya, for instance, the government purchased extensive areas of land in the former scheduled areas and white highlands in a programme designed to resettle and redistribute landless persons. In 1962, the million-acre settlement programme was launched and over 35,335 families (about 283,000) people were resettled on 470,000 hectares of land. On a smaller scale, the Harambee, Haraka and Ol Kalon Salient settlement schemes in all involved over 16,000 families. In 1971, under the Shirika programme, land purchased from expatriates were redistributed among 8,000 settlers (Adepoju, 1982; see Table 3).

The prime objectives of urban dispersal policies, as Nelson (1983) recalls, combine two broad strategies relating to measures aimed at reducing city-ward migration by dissuading potential migrants from moving to the cities and to measures to redirect migrations to alternative destinations. In all cases, the aim is not absolutely demographic: neither is the dominant strategy to ease problems caused, or more correctly exacerbated, by absolute size and rapid growth of cities. This is predicated on the belief that large population size is associated, among other things, with rising marginal costs of urban social services, which compound administrative difficulties, all too visible in the primate cities. Space permits for only too examples.

The expulsion of migrants from Mozambique's capital city is unique in Africa, and illustrates the role of the political organization in population distribution policies and implementation. Since July 1983, about 50,000 people out of a target of 100,000 have been evicted from major cities and resettled in rural areas in the north of the country — Nampula, Pemba and Lichinga — in order to relieve the pressure of population especially the unemployed, on Maputo which apparently doubled its population in eight years since independence in 1975. Initially, the jobless persons were given two weeks to voluntarily apply for resettlement in rural camps. Those who conformed initially — about 2,000 — were allowed to move to camps of their choice. Persons who lacked identification, employment, and residence cards were taken to any of the 30 ‘verification posts’ to obtain same or be sent to ‘evacuation centres’ where they were conveyed to rural settlements. Later, the brigades conducted night-time raids of houses in search of unemployed persons. Even then, some “expellees” have since found their way back to Maputo.

Tanzania's experiment — the Ujamaa villagization scheme — is often cited as the most elaborate and successful population redistribution policy, with focus on the
rural areas, the origin of the migrants. In Tanzania, the Arusha Declaration of 1967 from which the villagization programme took its root aimed to substantially reduce rural-urban migratory flows. One feature of the Ujamaa rural socialism scheme was the government’s commitment to redistribute the population scattered in numerous tiny hamlets into nucleated villages. The scheme, which encouraged people to live and work together in communal villages and build their own houses, aims to achieve greater efficiency in the provision of rural education, health, water services and production.

The policy was implemented in three phases. The so-called ‘selective approach’ (1967-69) involved selecting a few model villages where people were persuaded to move to. At the second stage (1969-73), labelled the ‘frontal approach’, resettlement programmes were set up in regions with special problems like flooding, drought and famine. Government and party institutions were mobilised and incentives were provided for the movers. The final phase (1973-76), termed ‘Operation Tanzania’, involved a more concerted effort to move more rural dwellers into the Ujamaa villages. Overall, the impact of the villagization scheme on population redistribution has been remarkable: by 1968, about 60,000 people were resettled in 180 villages and by 1973, up to two million people had been regrouped into nearly 57,000 Ujamaa villages (Mlay and Mujwahuzi, 1978).

Some governments pursue a policy of decentralization of the administrative machinery with the indirect effect (at least in the long run) of redistributing population. One example is the creation of 12 states in 1967 and 19 in 1975 in Nigeria, thereby diversifying the development zones and potential destinations for migrants.

Tanzania and Nigeria also pursue partial strategies for population redistribution, especially relocation of the national capital. (Ivory Coast has enacted a law early in 1983 to move its capital from Abidjan to Yamoussoukro, the home of President Houphuét-Boigny). All told, the relocation of national capitals from coastal to interior regions and new town development programmes are expensive to implement. Besides, their population redistributive impact is minimal, even in the long run (Richardson, 1983). The examples of Brazilia, Abuja, Dodoma also show that a long term perspective is desirable both to minimize cost and reap the indirect results of redistribution of population.

In the case of Abuja, for instance, it was estimated that between 150,000 and 320,000 persons would likely be resident there in 1986. The initial master plan for Abuja assume a target population of 1,642,100 for the year 2000, noting that the city ‘will be permitted to grow to a maximum population of approximately 3 million after which population growth will be accommodated in satellite towns” (quoted in ECA, 1980:214). What is perhaps intriguing is the projected annual growth of Abuja - 28 per cent in 1986-1990; 14 per cent during 1990-95, 10 per cent during 1995-2000 or an average growth rate of 17 per cent for the 1986-2000 period (12 per cent average based on the low variant population projection). Further, it was projected that the number of households will increase sharply from 32,194 in 1986 to 205,265 by 1995, further rising to 335,122 by the year 2000. However, under the medium variant projections prepared by the ECA, the households in Abuja would vary between 257,437 and 522,221 in the year 2000 based on 32,194 and 65,306 households in 1986. Correspondingly, the total population is expected to vary widely between 1,261,449 and 2,558,885 in the year 2000 under the medium variant projection. These obviously are guesstimates. We are all alive
to the huge but unproductive investment in Abuja; it is also unlikely that a large number of people would move there in the 80s.

V. BEYOND 1984: POLICY AND RESEARCH

This final section focuses on issues and directions of policy and research on population redistribution in the eighties. It is obvious from the examples in the previous section that the fundamental causes of migration and population distribution which lie in social and economic structures and relationships cannot be rapidly altered by policy to redistribute people arbitrarily. The trend in city-ward migration appears irreversible but “if allowed to proceed without due policy guidance,” Mabogunje (1981) warns: “population redistribution could aggravate existing development problems through excessive and premature metropolitanization of the population.” Hence, the promotion or the development of medium towns and rural development should be perceived as parallel strategies to slow down the growth of capital cities.

We are convinced that the regional containment strategy designed to induce migrants to remain in their home region by migrating to its urban centres rather than to the capital or other large cities (Richardson, 1963) is best suited to the socio-cultural situation in Africa. Besides diverting migration streams, the development of medium and small towns can be justified on economic, social and political grounds.

At the rural end, sustained efforts should be made to stimulate the growth and expansion of non-farm economic activities and, where economically feasible, the establishment of or active support for existing rural industries and craft activities in agropolitan centres to diversify the rural economy, generate additional employment opportunities, enhance the income of rural dwellers and may be reduce rural exodus. However, the unanticipated effect could be to further stimulate out-migration, especially of the highly potential migrants — the young, educated persons — just as improvements in urban job opportunities and other accommodationist policies would have the unintended effects of attracting additional migrants to the towns.

In order therefore to tackle, appropriately, the problem of migration simultaneously at both the origin and destination regions, a balanced development strategy of urban (large and medium towns) and rural areas should constitute an essential part of macro-planning. This implies an integrated employment approach that takes cognisance of the close inter-relationships and mutual reinforcement of both sectors but whose implementation is operationally complex.

In the 80s, the informal sector in urban and rural areas holds greater prospects for employment and income generation; it also absorbs migrants in urban areas as studies by Liedholm, Eicher, Norman, Teale, Chuta, Farooq, Adepoju, and the ILO team confirm. The discriminatory practices by planners should be removed and the sector be fully integrated into the framework of development. This, to my mind, calls for a drastic reorientation of the planning strategy and development policy.

The moderation of the rapid population growth in several African countries — the critical link in population distribution — should be of major concern in the 80s. Population planning, like economic planning, should be perceived as an important component of the overall framework of integrated socio-economic development programmes especially in view of the complex relationships between fertility, age structure, migration and population distribution. But ultimately, population redistribution...
policies should be tailored to the social, economic and political situation of African countries.

With respect to research, migration is an area of policy where societal and individual interests normally conflict: individuals migrate to maximize personal satisfaction but the aggregate of such behaviour in most cases does not optimise societal gains (Morrison, 1972). Demographers should endeavour to ascertain precisely the characteristics of movers, the motives for migrating and in particular, the choice of specific destination and the intention regarding future migration using large-scale sample surveys to obtain and tabulate the relevant information for households, localities and small area units. The use of the life-history matrix, social network analysis and panel follow-up surveys can improve the robustness of the measuring instruments. Such surveys should aim at obtaining the pertinent information to disaggregate the components of urban growth into natural increase and migration, and better still by the differential fertility performance of migrants and non-migrants. Such information is crucial in the formulation of policies on urban growth and population redistribution (Goldstein, 1981).

The study of non-mobility — that is, why some people do not migrate in spite of the powerful set of push and pull factors — should be pursued in the 80s, and should address the following questions: How is non-mobility associated with the people’s low level of material aspirations? Is non-mobility due to the extent of satisfaction of people’s aspirations under the existing (rural) opportunity structure? Are there better means of satisfying their aspirations than migrating to the cities? Is the decision not to migrate related to major obstacles: lack of education, birth rank? Or is the determining factor related to the lack of contact and consequently the limited information flow about the range of the opportunities in the towns? Are reasons socio-cultural in the form of institutional and other ties in the rural environment (e.g., social status, customary obligations)? (Adepoju, 1977). Answers to these questions could lead to the formulation of more purposeful strategies targeted at reducing migration of the marginal migrants whose decision can be greatly influenced by the relative prospects in urban and rural areas and at promoting more stable sedentary population.

So far, policies aimed at readjusting the spatial distribution of population are often linked with the broader development objectives and programmes, either explicit or implicit, often introduced for political, economic or strategic rather than demographic reasons. Nevertheless demographers can contribute substantially to the setting out of the objectives and strategies of policies and target population and more concretely, in the definition of the issues; to the articulation of policies; and more importantly to the continuous monitoring and evaluation of results of policies (both intended and unplanned) while planners and policy makers make the decisions and implement them accordingly. In the 80s, demographers should concentrate attention on the assessment of the consequences of population distribution policies — both intended and unanticipated, and as Goldstein adds, successful and unsuccessful ones, — the costs and benefits of alternative strategies and the time horizon for evaluation by using sensitive impact models. In all cases, data collection and monitoring system should be considerably overhauled and a system of evaluation procedure be built into the programme right from the formulation stage.

In general, a student of demography in Africa is all too often frustrated by the lack of reliable and current demographic data, especially for an analytical study of changes...
in population distribution and other key demographic variables, which are *sine qua non* to the formulation of policies, distribution or otherwise. While the 1980 round of censuses is expected to considerably improve the situation, both in terms of the countries involved and the types of information obtained, Nigeria is conspicuously missing from the list, even when her estimated population of about 81 million constitutes 16 per cent of the continent’s and 62 per cent of West Africa’s total population. Thus, the question (how many Nigerians?) posed by Aluko in 1965 remains unsatisfactorily answered in 1983, may still do till the end of this decade or century. The logical question is why has it proved so difficult to enumerate the population of this country within statistically acceptable degree of accuracy? This question becomes most disturbing when it is recalled that Nigerian demographers and statisticians constitute about 60 per cent of the total for Africa; that a number of these have served in the United Nation’s specialised agencies; in short that the expertise is available, and equally pertinent, that the financial resources can be marshalled.

The history and politics of censuses in Nigeria are all too familiar — and perhaps for most of us too recent — to warrant further elaboration here. It is sufficient to note here that the giant of Africa — in terms of human and natural resources, political leadership, population size — contends with the embarrassment of not knowing how many people there are and where they are located in its territory. Yet planning proceeds — and elections are held — based on fictitious and ridiculous population figures even when it is realised that planning for socio-economic development — housing, employment, education, hospitals — requires adequate knowledge about the number of people for whom such plans are made, their spatial distribution, com-

position by age and sex, occupation, education, ethnicity etc., and the projected patterns for the future. Thus, the seemingly insurmountable problem is the politicization of censuses or any data gathering mechanism, even when such would have generated indirect measures of the country’s population. The examples of the UPE enrolment (1976), voters registers (1978 and 1983) readily come to mind. In other countries, such indirect sources of data are used to validate, update and adjust census data and projections. Besides, Nigeria has no functional vital registration system. The National Demographic Sample Survey data conducted by the National Population Commission in 1980 are still being analysed while preliminary results of the Nigerian Fertility Survey have been published.

Realising, as Hauser and Duncan (1959) emphasised, that “the data of demography are spread out in time and space and only a minute or negligible portion of demographic events can be observed by any one investigator…… and because of their comprehensive and costly character, are necessarily provided in large part by governments”, the conduct of a technically accurate and (until January, 1984) politically acceptable census in Nigeria is a critical issue in the 80s.

Let me deviate a little. Our department is the first in Africa to design and run undergraduate programme in demography. This is a noble course and I would like to pay tribute to the founding fathers of the programme: late Professor Igun who nursed the idea, Professor Caldwell who introduced me to formal demography a decade and half ago, late Professor Glass who encouraged me to research into migration during my graduate studies, my predecessor, Professor Olusanya, and colleagues who nurtured the programme to maturity. Of course, I owe everything to God, and my late father who gave me a good start in life.
We are a leader in Africa as a teaching and research centre for African demography by Africans. International agencies - Ford, Rockefeller Population Council, IDRC, UNFPA to name a few - have renewed their interest and confidence in our programme; in fact we receive encouraging signals that our department would become a major training centre for (African) demographers on the continent. After all, close to 60 per cent of demographers in Africa are in Nigeria, and within Nigeria, the highest concentration is at the University of Ife.

We acknowledge the encouragement by these international organizations in providing funds which have greatly stimulated research into a variety of population topics, notably migration, labour force, family planning, and fertility decision making processes. As a group and as individuals we are continuously researching into the dynamics of demographic change in Nigeria and Africa. Our colleagues have served and are currently working in several international organizations which are expected to provide experts to assist the country in counting its population. We call on the federal government to wake up to her responsibility and support our research efforts. Small is beautiful: we are aware and are guided by the law of demand and supply not to quickly saturate the market with our trainees. Our graduates have so far been easily absorbed by the Federal Office of Statistics, the National Population Commission, government departments and the private sector. In all cases, reports of their excellent performances comfort us. Our graduate programme is picking up fast. Having graduated students at both Master and Ph.D degree levels, we are expanding the Masters programme to train the requisite cadre to teach demography and social statistics in the allied disciplines in the mushrooming universities and polytechnics in the country.

While reechoing the inevitable conclusion reached at the Bucharest World Population Conference in 1974 that "the human being is the supreme value of the world and its population the most precious treasure of every country", we look towards the future with hope and determination as pioneers in a field held with scepticism even by the educated. We cannot afford to fail. We must not. Indeed, we shall not.

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